General Glass Corp. v. Mast Construction Comp. : Petition for Rehearing by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1986
General Glass Corp. v. Mast Construction Comp. :
Petition for Rehearing
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Fabian & Clendenin; Warren Patten; W. Cullen Battle.
Ronald C. Barker; Mitchell R. Barker.
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, General Glass Corp. v. Mast Construction Comp., No. 860355 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1986).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/269






DOCKET NO. %&>3S&-CA 
• > 
BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GENERAL GLASS CORPORATION, 
a Colorado Corporation, et al., 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
MAST CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
a Utah Corporation, et al., 
Defendants and Appellants, 
Docket No. 860355-CA 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
* * * * 
APPEAL FROM THE RULING OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
THE HONORABLE TIMOTHY R. HANSEN PRESIDING 
* * * * 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
Warren Patten 
W. Cullen Battle 
Attorneys for Respondent 
American Savings & Loan Assoc. 
215 S. State, #1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
RONALD C. BARKER 
MITCHELL R. BARKER 
Attorneys for Appellants 
and Petitioners Ron Mast and 
Mast Construction Company 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
P1 s* 4"» #**•%% §-*> v ^ 
JUN2 ' vm 
BEFORE THE COORT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GENERAL GLASS CORPORATION, 
a Colorado Corporation, et al., 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
MAST CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
a Utah Corporation, et al., 
Defendants and Appellants, 
Docket No. 860355-CA 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
* * * * 
APPEAL FROM THE RULING OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
THE HONORABLE TIMOTHY R. HANSEN PRESIDING 
* * * * 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
Warren Patten 
W. Cullen Battle 
Attorneys for Respondent 
American Savings & Loan Assoc. 
215 S. State, #1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
RONALD C. BARKER 
MITCHELL R. BARKER 
Attorneys for Appellants 
and Petitioners Ron Mast and 
Mast Construction Company 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. JURISDICTION .. ii 
II. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
III. NATURE OF THE PETITION iii 
IV . OVERLOOKED FACTS 1 
V. MISAPPREHENDED LAW 2 
VI. LEGAL ARGUMENT 2 
A. Appellants as assignees cannot have their rights 
affected by a finding Ron Mast had notice 2 
B. This Court should not make a factual finding 6 
C. The Court has misread the mechanic's lien priority 
statute (38-1-5, UCA) 7 
D. The opinion sets a precedent dangerous to the 
economy 10 
E. All else being equal, the Mechanics' Lien Statute 
prevails over trust deed law 11 
CONCLUSION 12 
RELIEF REQUESTED 13 
ADDENDUM A: Article from Enterprise 
ADDENDUM B: Pertinent Statutes and Provisions 
ADDENDUM C: Opinion of Court of Appeals 
I. JURISDICTION 
This Petition for Rehearing is filed pursuant to Rule 35, 
R. Utah Ct. App. Mast Construction Company and Ron Mast 
petition the Court to review and reverse its ruling that 
American Savings & Loan's trust deed has priority over Masts1 
mechanics' liens. 
II. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Constitutional Provision, Statutes and Rules 
(Set forth in full in Addendum B): 
Former Art. VIIIf § 9, Utah Constitution 7 
38-1-1 to 26, Utah Code Annotated (1974) 3 
38-1-5, Utah Code Annotated (1953) 5, 6f 8f 9, 10, 12 
38-1-10, Ut£h Code Annotated (1953) 6 
38-1-26, Utah Code Annotated (1953) 2, 4 
57-1-6, Utah Code Annotated (1986) 12 
Rule 35, Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals i, iii 
Cases: 
Build, Inc. v. Italasano, 398 P.2d 544 (Utah, 1965) 6 
Calder Bros. Co. v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922 (Utah 1982) 8 
- ii -
First of Denver Mortg. Investors v. C. N. Zundely 
600 P.2d 521 (Utah 1979) 5, 6, 10 
Johnson v. Bell, 666 P.2d 308 (Utah 1983) 6 
Rasmussen v. Olsen, 583 P.2d 50 (Utah 1978) 6 
Mitchell v. Shoreridge Oil Co.f 75 P.2d 110 (Cal.App. 1938)....3 
Union Supply Co. v. Morris, 30 P.2d 394 (Cal. 1934) 3 
Smith v. Gunnissy 144 P.2d 186 (Mont. 1944) 3 
Brice Mortg. Co. v. Wodtke, 332 P.2d 1044 (Or. 1958) 3 
III. NATURE OF THE PETITION 
This is a Petition for Rehearing pursuant to Rule 35, R. 
Utah Ct. App. Both parties argued issues other than the one 
upon which the Court based its decision. Mast Construction and 
Ron Mast are the Appellants and Petitioners. American Savings 
is the Respondent. Masts believe the Court made its decision in 
error, and was perhaps not well enough educated by the briefs of 
respective counsel. 
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IV. OVERLOOKED FACTS 
The Court appears to overlook the significance of the 
status of appellants as both direct parties and as assignees of 
the rights of other lien holders. 
The Court notes in its decision that this action is a 
consolidation i- of actions brought by various lien holders. 
Opinion p, 5. And in a footnote (Opinion p. 5, n. 1) the Court 
observes that other lien claimants have assigned their claims 
and lien priorities to Ron Mast. The assignors to Mr. Mast were 
Intermountain Glass and Paintf Inc. and Marathon Steel Company. 
Additionally, Debenham Electric Supply Company assigned its lien 
2 priority to Mast Construction Company. R-II-118; R-III-1182. " 
The Court found ^ that Ron Mast had actual notice of the 
deed of trust prior to the date work commencedf and then 
concluded the trust deed is therefore valid and binding as to 
Ron Mast and Mast Construction. Opinion p. 7. That finding 
could not properly apply to the rights and priorities of other 
lien claimants, or to the priority of the liens assigned to Mr. 
T~. The actions consolidated are as follows: Debenham Electric 
Supply Co. v. Electro Technical Corp., et aT77 Civil Number 
C-85-1607; General Glass Corp. v. Mast Construction Co.y et al., 
Civil Number C-85-3Q67; and American Savings and Loan 
Association v. Oakhills Partnership, et al., Civil Number 
C-85-4855. See respondent's brief, p. 3. 
2. This was pointed out in Appellant's Brief, p. 2. 
3. As discussed below, the Court ought not to have made a 
finding of fact not made by the trial judge. 
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Mast and Mast Construction long after the occurrence of all 
operative facts in this case. 
V. MISAPPREHENDED LAW 
On the way to establishing the supposed priority of 
American Savings' deed of trust the Court simply finds Ron Mast 
had notice there would be such a deed. Having so found, the 
Court assumes mistakenly that it becomes unnecessary to analyze 
whether work commenced before proper recording of the trust 
deedf or to otherwise apply the mechanic's lien statutes. 
The holding effectively emasculates Utah mechanics1 lien 
law, and the adverse effect on the construction industry and 
economy in general could be dramatic. See Article, Appendix 
Exhibit 1. 
VI. LEGAL ARGUMENT 
Petitioners incorporate all the arguments contained in 
Appellant's Brief and Reply Brief/ and offer the following 
additional analysis in support of this Petition for Rehearing. 
A. Appellants as assignees cannot have their rights 
affected by a finding Ron Mast had notice. Mechanic's liens 
are freely assignable. Section 38-1-26, UCA (1953), states: 
All liens under this chapter shall be assignable 
as other choses in action, and the assignee may 
commence and prosecute actions thereon in his own 
name in the manner provided herein. 
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It is apparent the legislature intended all the rights a 
mechanic or materialman has to be assignable with the sub-
stantial rights afforded by law securely attached. See, Brice 
Mortg. Co, v. Wodtke, 332 P.2d 1044 (Or. 1958); Smith v. 
Gunniss, 144 P.2d 186 (Mont. 1944) . The assignee may enforce 
it precisely as if he were the original lienor. See, Union 
Supply Co. v. Morris, 30 P.2d 394 (Cal. 1934); Mitchell v. 
Shoreridge Oil Co.
 y 75 P.2d 110 (Cal.App. 1938). 
As stated above, Mast Construction is assignee of another 
mechanic's lien holder, and Ron Mast is assignee of two other 
mechanic's lien holders. So some of Mast Construction's rights 
and all of Ron Mast's rights arise by assignment. 
American Savings did not suggest to the Court in its 
brief that the law was as the Court found it: that actual 
notice to Ron Mast would give American Savings' deed priority. 
Surely this is because counsel had in mind the fact that Masts 
were protected by their assignee status, not just their status 
as general contractor. 
After finding Ron Mast was put on notice, the Court 
appears to overlook his (and Mast Construction's) true position 
as assignee and states: 
Because of the above, it is unnecessary to 
analyze whether. . . placement of electrical 
equipment at the building site constituted 
commencement to do work for the purpose of 
satisfying the mechanics' lien statutes, Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 38-1-1 to -26 (1974). The validity of the 
April 6, 1983 lien date is immaterial once the 
priority of American's deed of trust is 
established as to appellants. 
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The judgment of the court below that American's 
deed of trust was valid and had priority over all 
other liens is affirmed. 
Opinion, p. 7 (emphasis supplied). The bold faced portions of 
the holding appear to contradict each other, or at least the 
second appears to be a non sequitur as to the first. 
If the Court leaves intact its holding, the effect is 
unusual and undesirable. Mast surely cannot purchase the rights 
of others and still not better its position. The liens of 
Debenham Electric Supply, Intermountain Glass and Paint and 
Marathon Steel cannot have become less potent by being placed in 
the hands of the general contractor. And American Savings 
cannot receive the windfall that would result if the fortuitous 
transfer of the rights of certain mechanics lien holders to 
others robs them of their priority. 
All the above flies in the face of the obvious 
legislative intent in adopting 38-1-26, UCA (1953) (set forth in 
full on page three). What the statute gives in making liens 
assignable, the Court's decision seems to take away. 
The same public policy that creates a mechanics' lien 
dictates it should be freely and effectively assignable. In 
this manner the unpaid lien holder who is unable, for financial 
or other reasons, to sue on his claim, can still receive some 
amount of consideration for its labor or material. The value 
of the lien will be greatly reduced if it cannot enhance the 
position of the fellow lien holder to whom it is sold. 
-
 4 _ 
Statutorily allowing the assignment and leaving the lien 
priority unaffected does not change the position or expectations 
of the trust deed holder. 
Here it is undisputed that the assignments took place 
after occurrence of all the operative facts (commencement of 
work, recordings and corrective cancellations/recordings of 
trust deedf recording of mechanics' liens, etc.). When the 
rights of the assignor lien creditors were vesting and obtaining 
their priority, their holders had no material relation to any of 
the Masts. Nothing Ron Mast heard or saw long before the 
assignment can diminish the rights and priority of other lien 
holders who later assign them to Masts. Phrased another way, a 
defect (here notice) found in one lien cannot affect others. 
And the assignee takes no more or no less than the assignor had 
to give. 
This situation is analogous to that in First of Denver 
Mortg. Investors v. C. N. Zundel, 600 P.2d 521, 526, 527 (Utah 
4 
1979). " There the mechanic's lien holder who was found to have 
done the initial work on the property released its lien and 
priority to the construction loan mortgagee. The release stated 
that the release was final and would apply to all other 
T". The First of Denver case is also noteworthy in light of the 
controversy, not determined by the Court's initial Opinion, over 
whether the placement of a power box and cable constituted 
"commencement to do work or furnish materials on the ground for 
the structure or improvement." 38-1-5, UCA (1953). The Utah 
Supreme Court held in that case that installation of sewer and 
water lines in other parts of the same subdivision satisfied the 
statute, even though it appears they would have been less 
visible than the power box and cable here. 600 P.2d at 526. 
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mechanics' lien holders. 600 P.2d at 526. The Court held that 
since the release occurred after the work performed by the other 
lien holders in the casef it came after their lien rights had 
already attached. 600 P.2d at 527. It could not affect their 
status as lien holders. They were entitled to the priority 
date earned for them by the first performer of work on the 
project, even though that lien holder had released that priority 
as to himself and tried to do so as to the other mechanic's 
lienors. Id., citing 38-1-10, UCA (1953). 
Like the lender in First of Denver, American Savings 
cannot overcome priority of all lien claimants merely because of 
a loss of one's lien holder priority. 
B. This Court should not make a factual finding* The 
Court stated that in view of the fact Ron Mast is said to have 
signed a subordination agreement "we find that Ron Mast had 
actual notice of the deed of trust" before work commenced. 
Opinion p. 7. Judge Jackson points out that the Court has 
thereby made a factual finding that was not made by the trial 
court. Jackson, J., concurring, opinion p. 8. Actual notice is 
a question of fact. Johnson v. Bell, 666 P.2d 308 (Utah 1983); 
Opinion p. 6. 
In cases of equity, some limited fact-finding ability 
rests in the appeals court. Rasmussen v. Olsen, 583 P.2d 50 
(Utah 1978). But this is not so in law cases (like this one). 
Build, Inc. v. Italasano, 398 P.2d 544 (Utah, 1965). See also, 
former Art. VIII, § 9, Utah Constitution. 
C. The Court has misread the mechanics' lien priority 
statute (38-1-5, UCA). Utah's mechanics' lien scheme 
establishes a lien upon property to which the lienor has added 
value. Then it provides: 
The liens herein provided shall relate back 
tor and take effect as of, the time of the 
commencement to do work or furnish materials on 
the ground for the structure or improvement, and 
shall have priority over any lien, mortgage or 
other encumbrance which may have attached 
subsequently to the time when the building, 
improvement or structure was commenced, work 
begun, or first material furnished on the ground; 
38-1-5, UCA (1953)(emphasis supplied). There is no proviso 
automatically making a trust deed prior to mechanics' liens if 
the lienor has actual notice of the deed. Therefor, Masts 
believe the decision of the Court misreads the statute. 
It is true the section has a second half, which allows 
actual notice to diminish a lien holder's rights. The remainder 
provides: 
The liens herein provided shall relate back to, 
and take effect as of, the time of the com-
mencement to do work or furnish materials on the 
ground for the structure or improvement, and shall 
have priority over . . . any lien, mortgage or 
other encumbrance of which the lien holder had no 
notice and which was unrecorded at the time the 
building, structure or improvement was commenced, 
work begun, or first material furnished on the 
ground. 
By way of summary, the statute provides that the 
mechanic's lien holder has priority over the following: 
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1. encumbrances attaching after the date the first work 
was performed or first material was furnished, and 
2. encumbrances attaching prior to the commencement of 
work, but recorded after, except where the lien holder had 
notice. 
If American Savings1 trust deed is validly recorded 
despite the omissions and irregularities, the above statute 
allows the Court to rule in its favor only if the recordation 
date (April 8, 20 or 26, depending on which is valid) precedes 
the placement of the power panel and cable (or commencement of 
other work), or if that placement is held not to constitute 
"commencement to do work or furnish materials on the ground." 
If there was not a proper trust deed, if it was not properly 
notarized or if it was not duly recorded before work commenced, 
the statute allows the Court to rule in American Savings1 favor 
only as to lien holders who had notice of the trust deed. 
Unfortunately the Court went straight to number two 
above, applying the notice escape clause to benefit American 
Savings without first ruling on whether work was performed or 
material furnished prior to attachment of American Savings' 
lien. This despite the fact that "commencement to do work" is 
construed in favor of lien claimants as a general rule. Calder 
Bros. Co. v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922 (Utah 1982). 
The opinion is free of any analysis of the two issues 
pointed out by the Court (Opinion p. 6): 
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(1) was the recording of the deed of trust as it 
appeared on April 8, 1983 effective in view of the 
omissions thereon and that the signators were not 
placed under oath; and (2) did the placement of 
the electrical equipment at the building site on 
April 6, 1983, constitute commencement to do work 
for purposes of Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-5 (1974). 
Opinion p. 6. 
In light of all the authorities cited in the Masts' 
briefs and the facts of the case, these issues deserve 
treatment. It is far from clear that a deed so vague as to omit 
the name of the trusteef the amount of the secured debt, the 
corporate seal and the full address of the notary is 
nevertheless valid so as to impart constructive notice. The 
cases cited by Mast (brief 17-22) which require oath or 
affirmation must be followed or distinguished. And the Court 
should rule on whether re-recording a deed (and simultaneously 
crossing out the former priority date), with corrections made 
but without a new signature or jurat, is valid. As the 
concurring opinion noted, 
[wlithout addressing whether the April 8 trust 
deed from Oakhills* general partner to American 
was legally effective to create a lien, the 
majority has determined that it was "valid and 
binding" on Ron Mast and his company. 
Jackson, J. concurring, p. 8. 
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D. The opinion sets a precedent dangerous to the 
economy. Clearly the mechanics' lien priority section (38-1-5, 
UCA) exists to provide special protection to those adding to the 
value of property. First of Denver Mortg. v. C. N. Zundel & 
Assocs., 600 P.2d 521, 524-525. The decision of the Court seems 
to put that public policy at grave risk. 
The Court found Masts had notice simply because on March 
28 Ron Mast signed a subordination agreement (which nobody 
argues subordinates Masts' liens to American Savings. However, 
the only knowledge that would actually be imparted to Masts by 
that agreement would be the fact there would be a loan by 
American. As Judge Jackson noted: 
That agreement, however, does not mention anything 
about an existing or planned trust deed on the 
project site from Oakhills to American as security 
for the construction loan. 
Jackson, J. concurring p. 8. The potential lien holder on a 
project of any substantial size will know a loan is likely quite 
as well as Ron Mast knew it. Where will the line be drawn, if 
not precisely where the statute dictates? 
The subordination agreement that was thought by the 
majority to have imparted notice was executed long before the 
trust deed was even executed. The statute provides for notice 
to strip the lien holder of priority only if he had notice of 
the "lien, mortgage or other encumbrance." 38-1-5, UCA (1953). 
For purposes of the statute, can one have notice of a document 
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that has not even come into existence? 
More perplexing still: Is knowledge or reason to know 
that a loan will be needed tantamount to notice of the resulting 
trust deed lien? Mr, Mast's knowledge that a loan was 
contemplated should not strip him of his lien. Do we desire a 
precedent that gives potential laborers/suppliers every 
disincentive to get acquainted with the project and its 
participants? 
The lien priority statute is set up to create 
predictability in this area of the law. The decision of the 
Court does the opposite. Judge Jackson noted: 
I am concerned thatf under the majority's 
reasoning, no person who supplies material or 
labor on a construction job bigger than a child's 
sandbox will ever be able to achieve lien priority 
over an entity that loans money on the project. 
Every materialman on any job big enough to look 
like it requires financing will be charged with 
knowing or having reason to know thatf at some 
unknown future timef the lender will require the 
borrower to execute a deed of trust to secure a 
loan. This result undermines the purpose of the 
mechanics' lien statute. . . . 
Jackson, J. concurring p. 8. 
E. All else being equal, the Mechanics1 Lien Statute 
prevails over trust deed law. In effect, the Court has 
determined that the entity adding value to the realty by its 
labor or materials must strictly comply with the statute (as to 
commencement of work, filing the lien, etc.), but the lender 
need only approximate what the law requires. A material defect 
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(such as omitting the name of the trustee and the amount of the 
lien, or failure to swear the persons executing the deed) cannot 
be winked at in the trust deed, and result in a finding that it 
somehow supplies constructive notice as against the building and 
supplier. 
The Court does not quote the mechanics' lien priority 
statute, but only the statute on validity of a trust deed. 
57-1-6 UCA (1986). This is insufficient, since the mechanics1 
lien priority statute clearly governs, and by its terms 
supersedes an otherwise proper trust deed, except under certain 
circumstances. 38-1-5 UCA (1953) . It is true that the trust 
deed section provides that a trust deed is valid as to third 
persons with notice even if it is not properly acknowledged. 
57-1-6 UCA (1986) . As discussed above, Mast and Mast 
Construction had no notice. And even if they did this would not 
apply to them in their capacity as assignees of lien holders 
without notice. 
The only defect actual notice overcomes in the trust deed 
statute is a failure to properly prove, acknowledge or record 
the document. The other defects here present are not excepted. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Court based its decision on a theory which was not 
argued, either for or against, by either party, and did not 
treat the issues presented in any of the briefs. Undue emphasis 
- 12 -
was placed on notice, and the Court misread the statutes, made a 
factual finding not made in the lower court, and failed to 
consider the effect of the assignment of various liens to Masts* 
The net result emasculates the mechanics1 lien's statutory 
protection. 
VIII. RELIEF REQUESTED 
Mast Construction and Ron Mast jointly request that the 
Court rehear this appeal, considering each of the arguments made 
in the respective briefs on file, and reverse the holding of the 
trial court. The Court should find the Masts have priority over 
American Savings, or grant a new trial. 
Respectfully so requested this twenty-fourth day of June, 
1988. 
Ronald C. Barker & Mitchell RT^ 
Barker, attorneys for Ron Mast 
and Mast Construction Company 
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IX. CERTIFICATE OP SER/ICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a copy of the foregoing to 
be hand delivered (four copies) on this twenty-fourth day of 
Junef 1988f to: 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
Warren Patten 
W. Cullen Battle 
Attorneys for Respondent 
215 South State Street 
Floor 12 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
fonald C. Barker 
Mitchell R. Barker 
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ADDENDUM A: Article from Enterprise 
Volume 17, Number 51 Monday, June 20 
Judge blasts appeals court $3.4 foil 
ruling as opening Pandora
 c rpHjt / 
box against lienholders 
by Barbara Rattle 
Managing Editor 
Utah's Court of Appeals 
issued a decision last week that 
one judge, critical of the ma-
jority's reasoning, said renders 
it impossible for any person 
who supplies material or labor 
on a construction job "bigger 
than a child's sandbox" to ever 
be able to achieve lien priority 
over an entity that loans money 
on the development. 
"Every materialman on any 
job big enough to look like it re-
quires financing will be charged 
[under the majorit\ 's reasoning! 
with knowing or having reason 
to know that, at some unknown 
future time, the lender uil! re-
quire the borrower to execute a 
Nafl trucking 
firm scouting SL 
for substantial 
terminal site 
by Teresa Browning-Hess 
Staff Writer 
The Pride Lease Co. divi-
sion of Crete Carrier Corp., a 
Lincoln, Nebraska-based com-
mon and contract carrier truck-
ing company active throughout 
the country, is scouting the Salt 
Lake area for a site suitable to 
house a major terminal opera-
tion it plans to establish here 
this summer. 
Accoridng to Tonn 
Ostergard, executive vice presi-
dent and chief operating officer 
of the privately-held concern, 
Crete Carrier's Salt Lake facili-
ty will help to implement the 
romn^nx'*^ r>}^n to evrmnr] 
deed of trust to sccuie a loan," 
wrote Judge Norman H. 
jackson. "The majority's deci-
sion requires the materialman to 
become a fortune teller, thereby 
opening Pandora's box in cases 
where predictability is needed." 
The case involved an appeal 
see COURT page two 
by Teresa Browning-* 
Staff Writer 
San Jacinto Savir 
billion-asset financial 
based in Houston, wi 
a large scale credit a 
tion in Salt Lake th. 
that could ultimate! 
upwards of 150 peop 
San Jacinto presic 
| } * , * «* l - ; 
Great Western, fleet now exceeds 700 pieces of equipment 
91 new pieces of equipment ordered 
Great Western Leasin 
makes $1.5 mil. purch, 
by Barbara Rattle 
Managing Editor 
Salt Lake City's Great 
Western Leasing, a national 
lessor of semi tractors and 
trailers, is investing more than 
$1.5 million in the acquisition of 
91 new pieces of equipment, in-
cluding the concern's first pur-
chase of "bobtail" or straight 
trucks, prompting a correspon-
ding expansion of the firm's 
noting Great Western 
chased fi\e Whin 
semi tractors, 12 Fr< 
semitractors, 61 Gre 
flatbed and dropdeck 
10 utility flatbed tra 
three 18-foot Hino va 
The latter are a new ac 
the type of equipme 
Western has availa 
noted. 
Both thr ^nlf J PV 
looking at "a variety of other 
enterprises in Salt Lake." He 
added the Houston group is in 
-the b e g i n n i n g stages of 
negotiations" to acquire the 
credit card portfolio of iTirm 
already established.in the area, 
but declined to reveal the 
party's identity. 
"from a banking 'stand-
point, Utah has reasonable 
credit card provisions and a fine 
labor base — those two factors 
combined make it a great place 
for us to do business. We're a 
well capitalized organization 
and we believe our move into 
Salt Lake will be good for the 
community as well as good for 
us," Larson observed. 
San Jacinto Savings was 
founded in 1955 in Houston 
and was acquired by its parent 
company, the mammoth 
Candy 
(continued from page one) 
several factors, including local 
distribution accounts, the labor 
force and need for more space 
in which to launch the new line. 
"Because several of our 
distributors are located here, we 
thought it would be advan-
tageous to be closer to them," 
he said. 
Plans call for the addition of 
more than 100 employees to 
Sweet Thanks' current 
workforce of 14 by the end of 
the summer to manufacture the 
ne* candy product, which for 
reasons of competition Taylor 
declined to discuss at present. 
"He added, "the labor 
force is more plentiful here." 
Around 90 percent of the 
group's product is distributed 
out-of-state, said Taylor, who 
anticipates the new line will be 
ready for national sale in 40 
days. 
A 100 percent gross sales in-
crease is projected because of 
the new candy line, he said. 
Institution maintains 21 branch-
es scattered throughout Texas 
and boasts assets of approx-
imately S3.4 billion. 
Larson attributed San Jacin-
to's ability to weather Texas' 
poor economy while ,*till 
posting substantial profits 'to a 
well diversified asset base that is 
spread nationwide. 14We 
haven't concentrated on one 
specific geographic area and are 
thus not dependent on the 
economic ups and downs of one 
particular region," h^e ex-
plained. 
Court 
(continued from oaoe one) 
by Ron Mast and Ron Mast 
Construction Co., on their own 
behalf and as assignees of the 
rights of other holders of liens 
against the local Oakwood Hills 
condominium project, from the 
lower court's finding that a 
deed of trust filed by American 
Savings & Loan to secure a loan 
made to the project's developers 
was valid and has priority over 
all other liens against the 
development. 
The original deed was filed 
April 8, 1983, but contained a 
number of omissions. Mast 
daimed an April 28 lien placed 
by him against the project had 
priority over the deed because 
of its failure to conform with 
legal standards. 
However, the majority 
found that Mast had "actual 
notice" of the deed as required 
by law prior to its being filed, 
regardless of any omissions. 
The majority relied on Mast's 
E.S.I. Auto Leasing has 
secured an 8,200 square foot 
location at 6885 So. State St. in 
a transaction conducted 
Stanley, who was instrumental 
in establishing Western Savings 
of Arizona's credit card opera-
tion in Salt Lake last year, to 
organize its local efforts as well. 
According to Stanley, who cur-
rently serves as bank card direc-
tor for the Texas concern, "Salt 
Lake was such a positive move 
for Western that we thought 
we'd try to duplicate that suc-
-cess ourselves." 
Stanley indicated he found 
Salt Lake's work ethic and 
lifestyle to be "very conducive" 
to a business environment. 
having signed a subordination 
agreement on March 28, 1983 
that informed him that 
American was loaning money 
for the project on which he and 
other lien claimants eventually 
worked. 
Judge Jackson, while agree-
ing the alleged defects in the 
April 8 deed didn't deprive it of 
its legal validity or recordabflity, 
did express concern with the 
majority's reliance on the 
subordination agreement as 
having provided Mast with ac-
tual notice. The agreement, he 
said, does not mention anything 
about an existing or planned 
trust deed on the project site 
from Oakhills to American as 
security for the construciton 
loan. "I fail to see," he said, 
"how it proves that Mast had 
actual notice of a deed of trust 
that was not even executed until 
after the subordination agree-
ment was signed." 
(Case No. 860355-CA). 
through Tai Biesinger and Ken 
Keller of Pentad Properties and 
Bill Zimmerman of Coldwell 
Banker Commerical. 
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ADDENDUM B 
Constitutional Provision, Statutes and Rules 
Former Art. VIII, § 9, Utah Constitution 
38-1-5, Utah Code Annotated (1953) 
38-1-10, Utah Code Annotated (1953) 
38-1-26, Utah Code Annotated (1953) 
57-1-6, Utah Code Annotated (1986) 
Rule 35, Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals 
ART. VIII, § 9 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Cross-Reference. 
Statutory provisions,$78-5-l et soq. 
Appeals to distr ict court. 
rhere a justice of peace court was with-jurisdiction to bear and adjudicate the 
bject ma t te r of an action commenced 
erein, a district court to which an appeal 
IB taken did not acquire jurisdiction of 
{the action, even though district court 
ifeould have had original jurisdict ion of 
Ahe subject mat te r of the action. Bur t & 
Tar lquis t Co. v. Marks, 53 IT. 77, 177 P . 
224. 
Consolidating of city and justices' courts. 
Unit ing or consolidating of city and 
justices ' courts in different cities of state 
held valid. Leatham v. Eeger, 54 U. 491, 
182 P. 187. 
Legislative control in general. 
When last sentence in this section was 
inserted in Constitution, it had reference 
to law then in force, and construction of 
existing s tatutes by Supreme Court was 
part thereof. JSriscoe v. Rich, 20 U. 349, 
58 P. 837. 
Former s ta tute , analogous to ^8-5-1 et 
seq., held not enlargement of jurisdiction 
of justice of peace as it stood at time 
Constitution was adopted, and not invalid 
under last sentence in this section. Bris-
coe v. Rich. 20 U. 349, 58 P . 837. 
This section confers on legislature 
power to restrict jurisdiction of justices 
of peace by general law, but not to pre-
scribe jurisdiction for justices in particu-
lar localities of state different from that 
possessed by justices in state at large. 
Love v. Liddle, 26 U. 62, 72 P. 185, 62 
L. R. A. 482. 
Under this provision, legislature may 
determine of what matters , and when and 
how justices ' courts shall acquire and exer-
cise jurisdiction. State ex rel. Gallagher 
v. Third Judicial District Court for Salt 
Lake Countv, 36 U. 68, 104 P . 750. 
P a r t of state 's judicial system. 
Justices of peace courts constitute part 
of judicial system of Utah, In re Wise-
man, 1 U. 39. 
Collateral References. 
JDttBtJces of the P$a£e4S&, 31 "el seq. 
51 C.J.S. Justices of the Peace §§ 4, 26 
et seq. 
47 Am. Jur . 2d 920, 937, Justices of the 
Peace §§ 2, 30 et seq. 
Arrest, power of justice of the peace 
to take affidavit as basis for warrant of, 
16 A. L. R. 923. 
Compensation per diem, 1 A. L. R. 296. 
Faul t or omission of justice of peace 
regarding bond, undertaking, or recog-
nizance as affecting par ty seeking ap-
peal, 117 A. L. R. 1386. 
Judgment, prior action in justice's 
court in which claim might have been 
asserted by counterclaim, set-off, or cross 
petition as bar to subsequent independent 
action on such claim, 8 A. L. R. 735. 
License, liability for refusing to grant, 
85 A. L. R. 299. 
Pardon as restoring justice to office 
forfeited bv conviction, 47 A. L. R. 543, 
143 A. L. R. 172. 
Search warrant , civil liability for im-
proper issuance of, 45 A. L. R. 609. 
Set-off as between judgments, jurisdic-
tion of justice of peace to order, 121 A. 
L. R. 480. 
Summons or notice of commencement 
of action emanating from justice's court, 
effect of defects or informalities as to 
appearance or return dav in, 6 A. L. R. 
851, 97 A. L. R. 752. 
When title to real property deemed 
involved within contemplation of s tatute 
providing tha t justice of the peace (or 
similar court) shall not have jurisdiction 
of matters relating to tit le of land, 115 
A. L. R. 504. 
Sec. 9. [Appeals from district court—Prom justices' courts.] 
From all final judgments of the district courts, there shall be a right 
of appeal to the Supreme Court. *The appeal shall be upon the record 
made in the court below and under such regulations as may be provided 
by law. In equity cases the appeal may be on questions of both law and 
*fact; in cases at law the appeal shall be on questions of law alone. Ap-
peals shall also lie from the final orders and decrees of the Court in the 
administration of decedent estates, and in cases of guardianship, as shall 
be provided by law. fAppeals shall also lie from the final judgment of 
justices of the peace in civil and criminal cases to the District Courts on 
both questions of law and fact, with such limitations and restrictions 
as shall be provided by law; and the decision of the District Courts on 
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such appeals shall be final, except in cases iinolvhig the validity or con-
stitutionality of a statute. 
Cross-Reference. 
Appeals generally, Rules of Ci\ il Pro-
cedure, Rules 72-70. 
Appeal and review generally. 
Since the Constitution guarantees ap-
peals to the Supreme Court, the proceed-
ings relating thereto, in case the jurisdic-
tional steps h a \ e been taken, must he 
liberally construed so as to effectuate the 
exercise of the right rather than to ob-
struct it by strict construction. Rober-
son v. Draney, 54 U. 525, 182 P. 212. 
In absence of any specific legislative 
provision regulating proceduie in appeals 
from judgment or order of director of 
department of registration in revoking 
or refusing to re \oke physician's license 
Supreme Court has authority and duty to 
direct the procedure that shall be followed. 
Baker v. Depaitment of Registration, 78 
U. 424, 3 P. 2d 1<J82. 
When opinion of trial court is settled 
in bill of exceptions and made part of 
record on appeal, the opinion may be 
examined to ascertain the reason for the 
decision although it amounts to no ju-
dicial finding of fact and has no judicial 
effect whatsoe\er , since there is no deci-
sion until findings of fact, conclusions of 
law, and decree or judgment aie signed 
by the judge and filed with the clerk. 
Wasatch Oil Ri^f. Co. v. Wade, Judge, i»2 
lT. 50, 63 P . 2d 1070. 
Right to appeal is valuable i.nd consti-
tutional right and should not be denied 
except where it is clear that right ha* 
been lost or abandoned. Adamson v. 
Brockbauk, 112 V. 52. 1S5 P. 2d 264. 
Wheie*an appeal f?mn an into? locutoi % 
order permitt ing d w o \ e i \ i m o h e s issuer 
of fact, and there aie no findings- of f .a t , 
the Supreme Court does not re\ iew the 
facts but assumes th.it the trier of the 
facts found them in accord with its de-
cision; the Supreme Court affirms the 
decision if from the evidence it would be 
reasonable to find facts to suppoit it. 
Mower v. McCarthy, 122 V. 1, 245 P. 2d 
224. 
Premature filing of notice of appeal 
from denial of motion for wiit of habeas 
corpus did not d e p i a e the Supreme Couit 
of jurisdiction wheie the judgment as filed 
was in accoid with the ruling appealed 
from. Wood v. Turner, 18 U. (2d) 229, 
419 P. 2d 634. 
Appeal to district court from justice's 
court. 
Neither thi<* section nor statutes author-
ized city to appeal to district court fioni 
justice's court judgment in favor of ac-
cused in piosecution for ordinance viola-
tion. Castle Dale City v. Woolev, 61 U. 
291, 21- P. 1111, followed in 71 U. 328, 
265 P. 1117. 
Appeal to Supreme Court from juvenile 
court. 
Hearings in the juvenile court as to the 
custody of children are equitable, and the 
Supreme Court is chaiged with responsi-
bility for reviewing the evidence. State 
in Interest of K— B—, 7 U. (2d) 398, 32G 
P. 2d 395. 
Appeal to Supreme Court where case origi-
nated in justice or city court. 
Laws of terri tory controlled right of 
appeal to Supreme Court from judgment 
of territorial district court on appeal from 
judgment of justice of peace, even though 
appeal to Supieme Court was not per-
fected until after statehood. Hodson v. 
Union Pac. Ry. Co., 14 U. 381, 46 P. 270. 
Appeal lies to Supreme Court in every 
case which originates in justice's (or city) 
court and in which validity or constitu-
tionality of s tatute or city ordinance is 
drawn into question in, and is decided by, 
or ought to be decided b } , district couit 
on appeal to i t ; Supieme Court has no 
-jurisdiction to consider any question not 
affecting validity or constitutionality of 
statute or ordinance. Eureka City v. Wil-
son, 15 U. 5S, 48 P. 41, affd. 173 ' l ' . S. 32, 
43 L. Ed. 603, 19 S. Ct. 317; Post v. Foote, 
IS U. 235, 54 P. 975; State v. Briggs, 46 
1T. 23V, J4C P. 261; Pa ik Citv v. Daniels, 
46 U. 554, 149 P. 1094, Ann." Cas. 1918E, 
107, Salt Lake City v. Lee, 49 U. 197, 
161 P. 926; State \ . Roberts, i)(] V. 136, 
190 P. 351; State v. Holtgreve, 58 U. 563, 
200 P. S94, 26 A. L. R. 696; Logan Citv 
v. Blotter, 75 V. 272, 284 P. 333; Stat* 
v. L \ t e , 75 U. 283, 2S4 P. 1006; Bountiful 
City v. Granato, 77 V. 133. 292 P. 205; 
Ameiican Fork Citv v. Robinson, 77 t \ 
168, 292 P. 249; Salt Lake Citv v. Perkins, 
122 U. 43, 245 P. 2d 1176; Salt Lake Citv 
v. Giameii , 16 U. (2d) 245, 398 P. 2d 888, 
appeal dismissed 382 U. S. 23, 15 L. Ed. 
2d 17, S. Ct. 227; Salt Lake Citv ^ 
Peters, 22 L\ (2d) 127, 449 P. 2d *652; 
State v. Robinson, 23 I \ (2d) 78, 457 P . 
2d 969. 
Wheie question as to validity of con-
stitutionality of statute has been raised 
before district court, on appeal from jus-
tice's court, Supieme Court, on re\ iew, 
must affirm judgment if question was cor-
rectly adjudged; Supreme Court must 
further inquire whether, notwithstanding 
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error in deciding statutory question, there 
was decided any other matter or issue, 
not affected by statutory question, which 
in itself is sufficient to sustain judgment, 
and, if such is case, judgment must be af-
firmed, without determining whether ad-
judication on such other matter or issue is 
correct; if statutory question is of such 
force as to render correct decision thereof 
necessary to final adjudication, or if there 
has been no decision of any other matter 
or issue, not affected by statutory ques-
tion, sufficient to sustain judgment of 
district court, Supreme Court will reverse 
judgment and direct .proper judgment to 
be entered, or remand cause, as may be 
required by circumstances of each particu-
lar case. Eureka City v. Wilson, 15 IT. 53, 
48 P. 41, affd. 173 U. S. 32, 43 L. Ed, 603, 
19 S. Ct. 317. 
Exception, in last clause of this section, 
applies when validity or constitutionality 
of city ordinance, as well as when validity 
or constitutionality of statute, is involved 
in case originating in justice's court. 
Eureka Citv v. Wilson, 15 U. 53, 48 P. 41, 
affd. 173 XL S. 32, 43 L. Ed. 603, 19 S. Ct. 
317. 
Under this section, appeal may be taken 
to Supreme Court in all cases originating 
in justices' courts in which validity or 
constitutionality of statute or ordinance 
is drawn in question, made issue, and 
decided by district court on appeal; in all 
other cases transferred to district court 
from justices' courts, final judgment of 
district court is conclusive. Ogden City 
v. Grossman, 17 U. 60, 53 P. 9S5, following 
Eureka Citv v. Wilson, 15 U. 53, 48 P. 41, 
affd. 173 U. S. 32, 43 L. Ed. 603, 19 S. Ct. 
317. In Ogden City case, district court 
held unconstitutional city ordinance which, 
in justice's court, defendants had been 
found guilty of violating. However, in 
Town of Ophir v. Jorgensen, 63 IT. 288, 
225 P. 342, in which, seemingly, there was 
raised no question of constitutionality of 
town ordinance involved and only ques-
tion at issue was as to town's right to 
appeal from district court's judgment in 
action, originating in justice's court, for 
violation of ordinance, court said at p. 
290 of 63 Utah: "This court, in the case 
of Ogden City v. Crossman, 17 U. 00, 53 
P. 985, did entertain an appeal from the 
district court in a criminal case brought 
under a city ordinance * * *. But 
* * * that, case is not reasoned upon 
this question; the statutes and constitu-
tional provisions and general legal propo-
sitions involved are not discussed. The 
case ought to be deemed overruled, by im-
plication, bv the doctrine of Castle Dale 
City v. Woolley [61 U. 291, 212 P. 1111] 
and the holding in Salina Citv v. Freece," 
01 U. 574, 216 P. 1078. 
Supreme Court has no power, on appeal 
in case originating in justice's court, to 
determine whether district court's con-
struction of particular s tatute was errone-
ous. State v. Olsen, 18 IT. 484, 56 P. 22. 
Where case, originating in justice's 
court, did not involve validity or consti-
tutionality of statute, and unsuccessful 
plaintiffs had right of appeal to district 
court but, instead of appealing, petitioned 
district court for writ of prohibition and 
by petition raised same questions that had 
been raised in justice's court, appeal to 
Supreme Court could no more be taken 
from judgment of district court dismissing 
petition for writ than it could have been 
taken from adverse judgment of district 
court on appeal to it. Overland Gold Min. 
Co. v. McMaster, 19 U. 177, 56 P. 977. 
The word "s ta tu te" in last clause of 
this section includes municipal ordinances. 
Pa rk City v. Daniels, 46 U. 554, 149 P . 
1094, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 107. 
A city cannot appeal from the judg-
ment of the district court in criminal 
action for violation of ordinance where 
the action originates in the court of a 
city justice. Salina City v. Freece, 61 IT. 
574, 216 P. 1078. 
This section does not authorize a city 
to appeal from judgment on appeal from 
city court to district court, dismissing de-
fendant from custody, even though con-
stitutionality of ordinance under which 
defendant was prosecuted was involved. 
Town of Scipio v. Olsen, 71 U. 328, 265 
P. 1117, following Castle Dale Citv v. 
Woolley, 61 U. 291, 212 P. 1111. 
This section applies to and limits ap-
peals to Supreme Court from the district 
court in criminal cases, where case origi-
nated in city court, and was first appealed 
to district court. State v. Brown, 75 U. 
37, 282 P . 785. 
Certiorari from Supreme Court to review 
judgment in case originating in justice 
or city court. 
Supreme Court may, by certiorari, re-
view decision or judgment of district court 
in case appealed from justice of pence, 
even though validity or constitutionality 
of statute is not involved, where district 
court exceeded its jurisdiction or failed to 
acquire jurisdiction. Hansen v. Anderson, 
21 U. 286, 61 P . 219 distinguishing Crooks 
v. Fourth Judicial District Court, 21 V. 
98, 59 P. 529, and overruled in Smith v. 
District Court of Second Judicial Dist., 
24 IT. 164, 06 P. 1065 (Baskin, J., dissent-
ing) . (In Oregon Short Line R. Co. v. 
District Court of Third Judicial Dist., 30 
U. 371, 85 P. 360, court "adhered' ' to 
Crooks and Smith cases, and did not men-
tion Hansen case, but did, in effect, re-
turn to doctrine of lat ter case.) 
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Action of district court in dismissing, 
for want of prosecution, case appealed 
from justice court but not involving 
validity or constitutionality of statute, 
held final and not subject to review by 
Supreme Court on certiorari; certiorari 
may not be used to have mere errors or 
mistakes of district court reviewed. Smith 
v. District Court of Second Judicial Dis-
trict, 24 U. 164, 66 P . 100"), construed and 
adhered to in Oregon Short Line R. Co. v. 
District Court of Third Judicial District, 
30 IT. 371, 85 P . 360. 
Where judgment was rendered in dis-
trict court in favor of plaintiff in action 
before justice of peace and taken to dis-
trict court by appeal, and it was shown 
that district court had exceeded its juris-
diction, Supreme Court had power by cer-
tiorari to review such jurisdictional ques-
tion, such judgment not being reviewable 
by further appeal. Oregon Short Line P . 
Co. v. District Court of Third Judicial 
Dist., 30 IT. 371, 85 P. 360. 
The mere fact tha t court misconceives 
the law and acts contrary thereto in mat-
ter where it has jurisdiction of subject 
mat ter does not carry such act beyond 
jurisdiction of court, and its action is not 
reversible on certiorari; dismissal of ap-
peal from justice's court by district court 
on theory that undertaking, as required 
by law, had not been filed in justice's 
court, held not to exceed jurisdiction of 
district court, and such dismissal was not 
reviewable on certiorari. Hoffman v. 
Lewis, 31 U. 179, 87 P. 167. 
Equity as distinguished from law case. 
The Supreme Court, in cases at law 
tried before court without a jury, will 
examine the evidence only so far as may 
be necessary to determine questions of 
law, and it will not pass upon the suffi-
ciency of the evidence to justify finding 
or judgment, unless there is no legiti-
mate proof to support it and in no case, 
whether tried with or without a jury, will 
the appellate court determine questions 
of fact. Lvman v. Town of Price, 63 IT. 
^ 0 , 222 P.* 599. 
Since this section provides that in cases 
of law the appeal shall be on questions of 
law alone, where evidence was conflicting 
in law .action and there was substantial 
evidence to support findings below, Su-
preme Court would not weigh evidence but 
would affirm judgment. Osborn v. Peters, 
69 U. 391, 255 P. 435. 
Trial court cannot merely take the evi-
dence in equity case and certify record 
to Supreme Court for disposition of evi-
dentiary issues. In re Thompson's Estate , 
72 U. J7, 269 P. 103. 
A will contest is an action at law, not 
an equity case, and Supreme Court on ap-
peal cannot weigh and pass on conflicting 
evidence. In re Alexander's Estate, 104 
IT. 286, 139 P. 2d 432. 
As suit in equity to have a deed, abso-
lute in form, declared to be a mortgage, 
is a suit in equity, it is duty of Supreme 
Court, under this section of the Constitu-
tion, to review the facts. "In examining 
the transcript to determine what our con-
clusions from the evidence will be we are 
to make an independent analysis of it. 
If at the end of that investigation we are 
,in doubt or even if there be a slight pre-
ponderance in our minds against the trial 
court's conclusions we will affirm." Crock-
ett v. Nish, 106 U. 241, 147 P. 2d 853, 
following earlier Utah case. 
In a case at law, the appeal is upon 
questions of law alone. That being true, 
the function of the Supreme Court is not 
to pass upon the weight of the evidence, 
nor to determine conflicts therein, but to 
examine it solely for the purpose of deter-
mining whether the judgment finds sub-
stantial support in the evidence. Sine v. 
Salt Lake Transp. Co., 106 U. 289, 147 
P. 2d 875. 
Action to quiet ti t le to land would be 
considered as action at law rather than 
suit in equity with respect to extent of 
review on appeal, where no equitable is-
sues were involved. Dahnken v. Geo. 
Komnev & Sons Co., I l l U. 471, 184 P. 2d 
211. 
This section precludes Supreme Court on 
appeal in law case from reviewing facts 
found by jury, and Supreme Court must 
sustain verdict where there is substantial 
evidence to support it. Horslev v. Robin-
son, 112 U. 227, 186 P. 2d 592.* 
On appeal in equitable proceeding, Su-
preme Court is permitted to review both 
questions of law and fact, but that court 
will give consideration to findings of tr ial 
court and it will not disturb findings of 
fact unless i t appears that trial judge 
made findings against weight of evidence. 
Peterson v. Peterson, 112 IT. 554, 190 
P. 2d 135. 
Where action was brought to enforce 
terms of a lease and involved no equitable 
issues, only errors of law could be re-
viewed bv Supremo Court. Jesper*cn v. 
Deseret News Publishing Co., 119 IT. 235, 
225 P . 2d 1050. 
In an action at law, the appellate court 
is powerless to substitute another evalu-
ation of the evidence for that of the tr ial 
court, where such evidence was conflicting. 
Pixton v. Dunn, 120 U. 658, 238 P. 2d 408. 
In a case in equity the Supreme Court 
has responsibility to review the evidence. 
Nokes v. Continental Miii. & Mill. Co., 6 
IT. (2d) 177, 308 P. 2d 954. 
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In equity cases the Supreme Court re-
views the evidence, keeping in mind that 
the trial court heard and saw the witnes-
ses, and reverses if the court concludes 
that the evidence clearly preponderates 
against the decision. Barker v. Dunham, 
9 U. (2d) 244, 342 P. 2d 867. 
Although the question of a boundary 
line by acquiescence is a matter of equity, 
the Supreme Court will reverse the trial 
court's findings of fact only if it concludes 
that they are clearly erroneous. Nunley v. 
Walker, 13 U. (2d) 105, 309 P. 2d 117. 
In an equity case in which the Supreme 
Court reviews the findings of fact of the 
trial court, it overturns them only where 
it is manifest tha t the trial court has 
misapplied proven facts or made findings 
clearly against the weight of the evidence. 
Metropolitan Investment Co. v. Sine, 14 
U. (2d) 36, 376 P . 2d 940. 
Even though Constitution states that in 
equity cases court may review facts, court 
will nevertheless take into account ad-
vantaged position of trial judge. Stone v. 
Stone, 19 U. (2d) 378, 431 P. 2d 802. 
In proceeding to settle partnership ac-
counts, findings that proceeds from ranch 
sale were partnership assets were review-
able under this section but were not dis-
turbed because preponderance of evidence 
was not against the findings, discretion 
was not abused, and injustice did not re-
sult. Corbet v. Corbet, 24 U. (2d) 378, 
472 P. 2d 430. 
Final judgment. 
I t is a termination of a particular action 
which marks the finality of the judgment, 
and a decision which terminates the suit, 
or puts the ease out of court without an 
adjudication on the merits is neverthe-
less a final judgment ; test of finality is 
not whether whole matter involved in ac-
tion is completed but whether the action 
is terminated bv the judgment. Benson v. 
Rozzelle, 85 U. 582, 39 P. 2d 1113. 
Judgment dismissing action without 
prejudice was a final and appealable judg-
ment where the judgment of dismissal was 
entered after a new trial had been granted, 
over defendant's objection, on ground of 
error in instruction. Klinge v. Southern 
Pac. Co., 89 IT. 284, 57 1\ 2d 367, 105 
A. L. R. 204. 
Judgment denying rescission but con-
struing contract to mean that defendant 
was liable under certain conditions was 
a conclusion of law in so far as appeal 
was concerned and was a final decree. 
Minersville "Reservoir & Irr. Co. v. Rocky 
Ford Irr. Co., 90 V. 283, 61 P. 2d 605. 
The question of whether an order of 
dismissal is a final and appealable judg-
ment which involves the jurisdiction o: 
the Supreme Court is a matter the cour 
will itself notice, though not called to it; 
attention bv either partv. Shurtz v. Thor 
ley, 90 U. 381, 61 P. 2d 1262. 
A final judgment is an adjudication tha 
disposes of the case as to all the parties 
and which finally disposes of the subjec 
matter of the litigation on the merits o 
the case. Shurtz v. Thorley, 90 U. 381, 6 
P. 2d 1262. 
The decisions of a district court ii 
cases brought before it from either jus t ic 
of the peace courts or a city court an 
final decisions within meaning of thi-s sec 
tion. State v. Johnson, 100 U. 316, l b 
P. 2d 1034, distinguished in 115 U. 394 
205 P. 2d 247, 250. 
In action to determine and quiet right 
in waters from a lake and its t r ibutarie 
and to enjoin winter-flooding of lands 
order denying petition of defendants ti 
have court call in state engineer and b 
proceed to hear the action as a statutory 
adjudication was a final judgment fron 
which an appeal could be taken. Salt Lak< 
City v. Anderson, 106 IT. 350, 148 P . 2< 
346. 
Where an order grant ing defendant ' 
motion for a new trial merely set aside th< 
jury verdict and placed the parties in tin 
same position as they had been prior ti 
trial, such order was not a final judgmen 
from which an appeal could be taken, anc 
complaining plaintiff's proper recourse wa 
either a petition for interlocutory appea 
under Rule 72 (b) , Rules of Civil Pro 
cedure, or preservation of the claime< 
error for review upon final judgment 
Haslan v. Paulsen, 15 U. <'2d^ 185, 38! 
P. 2d 736. 
Mandamus to compel district court to ac 
in case appealed from justice or cit: 
court. 
Where district court dismissed appea 
from justice's court wrongfully or withou 
cause, remedy was by writ of mandati 
to require district court to vacate orde 
of dismissal, reinstate appeal, and procee< 
to hear cause on its merits. Hoffman v 
Lewis, 31 U. 179, 87 P. 167. 
While if district court passes upoi 
merits of case appealed to it from justice 
court, its errors, however gross, canno 
be reviewed by Supreme Court, becaus 
district court is the court of last resor 
on such appeals, still if district court 
without sufficient or any legal reason, re 
fuses to dispose of the appeal upon tin 
merits, Supreme Court must require tha 
court to hear and determine the same upoi 
its merits, and make findings and con 
elusions of law in accordance with tit 
evidence as it finds it to be, and ente 
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judgment accordingly. Salt Lake Coffee 
& Spice Co. v. District Court of Salt Lake 
County, 44 U. 411, 140 P. 6C6. 
Mandamus to reinstate appeal was 
proper remedy where appeal was dismissed 
on ground that district court was without 
jurisdiction as matter of law when court 
in fact had jurisdiction of appeal. Hanson 
v. Iverson, District Court Judge, 61 U. 
172, 211 P. 682. 
Motion for new trial. 
A judgment becomes final, for purpose 
of appeal, when the motion for a new trial 
is overruled, and effect of a motion for a 
new trial , when seasonably made, is to 
suspend the judgment or decree for pur-
poses of appeal until the motion has been 
disposed of. Petersen v. Ohio Copper Co., 
71 U. 444, 266 P. 1050. 
Where no motion was made for directed 
verdict or new trial, the Supreme Court 
was precluded from reviewing sufficiency 
of evidence in action at law, since under 
this section appeal may be made only on 
questions of law. Brigham v. Moon Lake 
Electric Assn., 24 U. (2d) 292, 470 P . 2d 
893. 
Water Conservancy Act. 
This constitutional provision applies 
only to appeals from final judgments of 
district courts, not from district boards 
such as created by the Water Conservancy 
Act. But that act, in so far as it attempted 
to abrogate right of appeal from final 
judgments of court allowing or dismissing 
petition for organization of district, vio-
lated this section. (73-9-1 et seq.) Patter-
ick v. Carbon Water Conservancy Dist., 
106 U. 55, 145 P . 2d 503. 
Collateral References. 
Appeal and Error€=>4; Courts<S=>190. 
4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error §§ 18-22. 
4 Am. Jur . 2d 532, 535, Appeal and 
Error §§ 1, 4. 
Moot questions: when criminal case be-
comes moot so as to preclude review of or 
at tack on conviction or sentence, 9 A. 
L. R. 3d 462. 
Plea of guilty in justice of peace court 
as precluding appeal, 42 A. L. R. 2d 995. 
Reviewability, on appeal from final 
judgment of justice of the peace result-
ing in trial de novo, of interlocutory 
order, as affected by fact that order was 
separately appealable, 79 A. L. R. 2d 1367. 
Law Review. 
Proposals for Truce In The Holy War: 
Utah Adoption, Richard I. Aaron, 1970 
Utah L. Rev. 325. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Review of facts in equity cases. 
Since action to recover money claimed 
to be owing on contract, wherein fore-
closure of mortgage or other lien to secure 
only advisory to trial court, by virtue of 
Code 1943, 104-23-5, as amended by Laws 
1945, ch. 25, this constitutional provision 
required that facts in such case be re-
payment thereof was also sought, was case viewed by Supreme^Court on appeal. Pe t ty 
in equity and jury's decision therein was v« Clark, 113 U. 205, 192 P. 2d 589. 
Sec. 10. [County attorneys—Election, terms, appointment pro tempore.] 
A county attorney shall be elected by the qualified voters of each 
county who shall hold his office for a term of four years. The powers 
and duties of county attorneys, and such other attorneys for the state 
as the legislature may provide, shall be prescribed by law. In all cases 
where the attorney for any county, or for the state, fails or refuses to 
attend and prosecute according' to law, the court shall have power to ap-
point an attorney pro tempore. (As amended November 5, 1946, effective 
January 1, 1947.) 
Cross-Reference. 
Statutory provisions, 17-18-1 et seq. 
Construction, operation and effect. 
The 1947 amendment to 17-10-6, provid-
ing that county attorneys be elected at 
general election held in November, 1950 
and every four years thereafter, and that 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1945 amendment was proposed by 
House Joint Resolution No. 4, Laws 1945, 
p. 321, and was adopted at the general 
election on November 5, 1940, and became 
effective January 1, 1947. The amendment 
increased the term of county attorneys 
from two to four years. 
2G5 
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erected without knowledge and consent of 
owner thereof, or mechanic's lien holders, does 
not relieve building in its new location from 
liability of a deficiency existing on the sale of 
the land on which the building was erected to 
satisfy such hens Sanford v Kunkel, 30 Utah 
379, 85 P 363, 85 P 1012 (1906) 
Scope and extent of l ien genera l ly . 
Necessary appurtenances, including ease-
ments which extend outside of boundaries of 
land upon which building is erected, is covered 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 53 Am J u r 2d Mechanics' 
Liens § 39 
C.J.S. — 57 C J S Mechanics' Liens § 20 
A.L.R. — Mechanic's lien for work on or ma-
ANAIASIS 
Commencement and duration of hen 
"Commencement to do work " 
Estoppel 
Extent of hen 
Notice to hen holders 
Priority over other hens and claims 
Purchase money mortgage 
Questions of law and fact 
Real estate mortgage 




C o m m e n c e m e n t a n d d u r a t i o n of lien. 
This section expressly provides that hens 
shall attach at the time the performance of the 
contract commences, accordingly claimant's 
hen attaches on the date he commences the 
by provisions of this section Park City Meat 
Co v Comstock Silver Mining C o , 36 Utah 
145, 103 P 254 (1909) 
Waiver, loss or forfeiture of lien. 
Where there is substantial compliance with 
statute creating lien, and hen has in fact been 
established, hen so established cannot be de-
feated by technicalities nor by nice distinc-
tions Park City Meat Co v Comstock Silver 
Mining Co , 36 Utah 145, 103 P 254 (1909) 
tenal for separate buildings of one owner, 15 
A L R 3d 73 
Key Numbers. — Mechanics' Liens *=> 22 
work or furnishes the material, and is not post-
poned to the date of filing the notice for record 
Morrison v Carey-Lombard Co , 9 Utah 70, 33 
P 238 (1893) 
Mechanic's hen takes effect as of the date of 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
38-1-5. Priority — Over other encumbrances. 
The liens herein provided for shall relate back to, and take effect as of, the 
time of the commencement to do work or furnish materials on the ground for 
the structure or improvement, and shall have priority over any lien, mortgage 
or other encumbrance which may have attached subsequently to the time 
when the building, improvement or structure was commenced, work begun, or 
first material furnished on the ground; also over any lien, mortgage or other 
encumbrance of which the lien holder had no notice and which was unre-
corded at the time the building, structure or improvement was commenced, 
work begun, or first material furnished on the ground. 
History: R.S 1898 & C.L. 1907, §§ 1384, Cross-References . — Priority of lessor's 
1835; C.L. 1917, §§ 3734, 3735; R.S. 1933 & C. hen, § 38-3-2 
1943, 52-1-5. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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commencement of work and furnishing of ma-
terials, and is prior to intervening equities. 
Sanford v. Kunkel, 30 Utah 379, 85 P. 363, 85 
P. 1012 (1906). 
When labor and materials are furnished to 
one not an owner, lien attaches to title instant 
title vests in owner so contracting for labor and 
materials furnished before he became the 
owner. United States Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. 
Mid vale Home Fin. Corp., 86 Utah 506, 44 
P.2d 1090, rehearing denied, 86 Utah 522, 46 
P.2d 672 (1935). 
Whether the subsequent furnishings of ma-
terials is part of one continuous transaction, in 
which case the priority date of the lien would 
relate back to the first delivery date, or 
whether such furnishings constitute separate 
contracts, in which case there would be no rela-
tion back, is a question of fact. Boise Cascade 
Corp. v. Stephens, 572 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1977). 
"Commencement to do work." 
The phrase "commencement to do work," as 
used in this section, is construed in favor of 
lien claimants. Calder Bros. Co. v. Anderson, 
652 P.2d 922 (Utah 1982). 
Estoppel. 
A person furnishing materials may be es-
topped by his or its acts and conduct from en-
joying the priority accorded by this section. 
Spargo v. Nelson, 10 Utah 274, 37 P. 495 
(1894). 
Extent of lien. 
While mortgagee who advances money to 
mortgagor to construct a building has lien 
prior to that of a subcontractor performing 
labor and furnishing materials for such build-
ing, such lien extends only to amount actually 
advanced on mortgage. Culmer Paint & Glass 
Co. v. Gleason, 42 Utah 344, 130 P. 66 (1913). 
Notice to lien holders. 
This section requires other lien holders, by 
mortgage or otherwise, to take notice of the 
commencement of work on the building. 
Teahen v. Nelson, 6 Utah 363, 23 P. 764 
(1890). 
Survey of property did not meet the notice 
standard contemplated by this section where 
the survey stakes were not sufficiently notice-
able or related to actual construction to impart 
notice to a prudent lender. Tripp v. Vaughn, 
747 P.2d 1051 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Priority over other liens and claims. 
A deed of trust upon a canal to be con-
structed cannot take precedence over a me-
chanic's lien for work done and materials fur-
nished in building the canal, although trust 
deed antedates the doing of the work or fur-
nishing the materials. Canal is not in existence 
until constructed. Garland v. Bear Lake & 
River Waterworks & Irrigation Co., 9 Utah 
350, 34 P. 368 (1893), afTd, 164 U.S. 1,17 S. Ct. 
7, 41 L. Ed. 327 (1896). 
Lien for all of materials furnished by single 
lien claimant on continuous, open, running ac-
count, for purpose of developing and operating 
mine, held prior to trust deed executed by min-
ing company and recorded between times when 
materials are first and last furnished. Fields v. 
Daisy Gold Mining Co., 25 Utah 76, 69 P. 528 
(1902); Salt Lake Hdwe. Co. v. Fields, 69 P. 
1134 (1902) (not officially reported). 
Where vendees of land contracts on property 
involved jointly assigned errors in mortgage 
foreclosure action on cross-appeal, their liens 
are postponed to date of last vendee's contract, 
and claims of lien claimants attach as of date 
when first materials are furnished and first 
labor performed; and claim of lien claimants is 
held superior to claim of such vendees in fore-
closure action. United States Bldg. & Loan 
Ass'n v. Midvale Home Fin. Corp., 86 Utah 
506, 44 P.2d 1090, rehearing denied, 86 Utah 
522, 46 P.2d 672 (1935). 
Lien for labor and materials supplied pur-
chaser of lot for building constructed thereon is 
inferior to interest of vendor of the lot and his 
successor, where it is not shown that vendor or 
his successor consent to, ratify, or authorize 
the furnishing of the materials and labor. Bur-
ton Walker Lumber Co. v. Howard, 92 Utah 
92, 66 P.2d 134 (1937). 
In determining priorities between construc-
tion mortgagee and mechanic's lienors, mort-
gage for definite amount recorded prior to at-
tachment of any lien takes priority up to the 
amount actually paid over any mechanic's 
liens attaching subsequent to recording of 
mortgage, although loan which mortgage is in-
tended to secure is paid over to borrower as 
needed and never advanced in full. Western 
Mtg. Loan Corp. v. Cottonwood Constr. Co., 18 
Utah 2d 409, 424 P.2d 437 (1967). 
Purchase money mortgage. 
A mechanic's lien is superior even to a pur-
chase money mortgage given at time of pur-
chase of property in question where mortgagee, 
after materials are furnished, releases original 
mortgage and takes new mortgage, which 
transaction, however, is not in renewal of old 
mortgage, but is done to obtain increased secu-
rity on old debt. But after satisfaction of lien, 
mortgagee is entitled to surplus. Badger Coal 
& Lumber Co. v. Olsen, 50 Utah 307, 167 P. 
680 (1917). 
Purchase money mortgage had priority over 
a mechanics' lien where the mechanics' lien did 
not attach until after the mortgage was re-
corded. Calder Bros. Co. v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 
922 (Utah 1982). 
Questions of law and fact. 
In action involving priority between mort-
gages and mechanic's lien, whether all mate-
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rials furnished during certain period are fur-
nished under one contract or under different 
contracts is question of fact Gwilham Lumber 
& Coal Co v El Monte Springs Corp , 87 Utah 
134, 48 P2d 463 (1935) 
Real estate mortgage. 
A mortgagee who loans money to a mort-
gagor-borrower generally is not only entitled 
but obliged to pay out the money in accordance 
with the directions of the borrower, however, if 
the mortgagee knows that the monev is being 
borrowed for the purpose of creating improve-
ments and that materials are being furnished 
under such circumstances that the mortgagee 
should know that materialmen are relying on 
being paid from such funds, and if the mort-
gagee knows that the money is being diverted 
into other purposes, then under such circum-
stances the mortgagee is not accorded priority 
as to those funds advanced after a material-
man starts delivering building supplies Utah 
Sav & Loan Ass'n v Mecham, 11 Utah 2d 159, 
356 P2d 281 (1960) 
A mortgagee may be estopped from claiming 
a priority over a mechanic's hen, however, in 
order to establish an estoppel, the lien claim-
ant must show some concealment, misrepre-
sentation, act, or declaration by the mortgagee 
upon which the hen holder properly relies and 
by which he is induced to act differently than 
he would otherwise act Utah Sav & Loan 
Ass'n v Mecham, 12 Utah 2d 335, 366 P 2d 
598, 15 A L R 3d 63 (1961) 
Recordation and notice. 
From the time the contractor begins to fur-
nish materials, it is notice to anyone thereafter 
contracting with the owner that the property is 
burdened with a lien, and no previous notice is 
required, and by the terms of this section, the 
hen relates back to the time of furnishing the 
materials Car> -Lombard Lumber Co v 
Sheets 10 Utah 322 37 P 572 (1894) 
Materialmen furnishing an occupying claim-
ant of real estate, material for impro\ements 
theron with record notice of a prior mortgage 
on the premises, have no lien against the true 
owner thereof particularly where occupying 
claimant's claims to property are based upon 
fraud and lack of good faith Doyle v West 
Temple Terrace Co , 47 Utah 238, 152 P 1180 
(1915) 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 53 Am Jur 2d Mechanics' 
Liens * 263 
C.J.S. — 57 C J S Mechanics' Liens § 197 
A.L.R. — Mechanic's hen based on contract 
Relation back. 
Mechanics' liens arising from the furnishing 
of materials and labor, both on the overall 44-
acre site and on individual condominium units 
within the development, related back to the 
initial work done on the project First of 
Denver Mtg Investors v C N Zundel & 
Assocs, 600 P2d 521 (Utah 1979) 
The priority of all mechanic's hens arising 
from a project is determined by the date of com-
mencement of work on the project site or fur-
nishing materials on the site and the release of 
his claims and hens by the lien holder who so 
commenced work or initially furnished mate-
rials does not affect the priority of other hens 
First of Denver Mtg Investors v C N Zundel 
& Assocs, 600 P2d 521 (Utah 1979) 
For one contractor's hen to relate back to the 
commencement of work or supplying of mate-
rials by another contractor, both contractors' 
projects must have been performed in connec-
tion with what is essentially a single project 
performed under a common plan prosecuted 
with reasonable promptness and without mate-
rial abandonment, however, ordinary mainte-
nance and cleanup work does not constitute a 
sufficient basis to permit "tacking" in order to 
fix an earlier hen date under this section for 
labor and materials supplied Calder Bros Co 
v Anderson, 652 P 2d 922 (Utah 1982) 
The right to have a mechanic's hen relate 
back to the commencement of work is not de-
feated merely because the owners did not em-
ploy a general contractor but, instead, con-
tracted individually with various subcontrac-
tors Duckett v Olsen, 699 P 2d 734 (Utah 
1985) 
Subdivision development. 
Work of la\ing out and developing subdivi-
sion including engineering, installing water 
mains sewer mams and laterals, curbs and 
gutters, surfacing streets* and other off-site 
construction does not gi\e rise to mechanic's 
lien attaching to particular home being con-
structed within subdi\ision Western Mtg 
Loan Corp v Cottonwood Constr Co , 18 Utah 
2d 409, 424 P 2d 437 (1967) 
Cited in Knight v Post, 748 P 2d 1097 (Ct 
App 1988) 
with vendor pending executory contract for 
sale of property as affecting purchaser's inter-
est, 50 ALR3d 944 




erty, is properly admitted in evidence Garfier 
v. Van Patten/20 Utah 342, 58 P. 684 (1809). 
Where labor is performed or materials fur-
nished upon several buildings owned by the 
same person or persons, a claimant may in-
clude in one claim all amounts due and the 
claim will not be defective if the amount due on 
each separate building is not designated. Utah 
Sav & Loan Ass'n v. Mecham, 12 Utah 2d 335, 
366 P.2d 598, 15 A.L.R.3d 63 (1961). 
If a claimant files a lien against more than 
one piece of property belonging to the same 
owner without designating the amount due on 
each building or improvement, he may enforce 
the lien against the owner; however, if there 
are other lien claimants of the same class, his 
claim is subordinate to theirs if the claims of 
the latter are against only one of the buildings 
or if they complied with this section. Utah Sav. 
& Loan Ass'n v. Mecham, 12 Utah 2d 335, 366 
P.2d 598, 15 A.L.R.3d 63 (1961). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 53 Am. Jur. 2d Mechanics' 
Liens § 185. 
C.J.S. — 57 C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens § 134. 
A.L.R. — Mechanic's lien for work on or tfia-
terial for separate buildings of one owner, 15 
A.L.R.3d 73. 
Key Numbers. — Mechanics' Liens *=» 
130(1). 
38-1-9. Notice imparted by record. 
{\) The recorder must record the c\aim in an index maintained for that 
purpose. 
(2) From the time the claim is filed for record, all persons are considered to 
have notice of the claim. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1389; 
C.L. 1917, § 3739; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
52-1-9; L. 1987, ch. 50, § 5. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment divided this section into subsections, sub-
stituted "an index maintained for that pur-
pose" for "a book kept by him for that purpose, 
and" at the end of Subsection (1); and substi-
tuted "the claim is filed" for "of the filing 
thereof" and "are considered to have notice of 
the claim" for "shall be deemed to have notice 
thereof and made a capitalization and punctu-
ation change in Subsection (2). 
Cross-References. — Record as imparting 
notice, k 57-3-2. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 53 Am 
Liens § 186 
Jur. 2d Mechanics' C.J.S. —57 C.J.S 
Key Numbers. — 
Mechanics' Liens § 131. 
Mechanics' Liens «=» 159 
38-1-10. Laborers' and materialmen's lien on equal footing 
regardless of time of filing. 
The \\£T\s for VJOYVL ai\d l^box &vv& or ra&teY\&l furaisk^d as provided ra tt\\s 
chapter shall be upon an equal footing, regardless of date of filing the notice 
and claim of lien and regardless of the time of performing such work and labor 
or furnishing such material. 
History: Code Report; R.S. 1933 & C. 
1943, 52-1-10. 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Relation back. his claims and hens by the hen holder who so 
The priority of all mechanic's hens arising commenced work or initially furnished mate-
from a project is determined by the date of com- rials does not affect the priority of other hens 
mencement of work on the project site or fur- First of Denver Mtg Investors v C N Zundel 
nishmg materials on the site and the release of & Assocs , 600 P.2d 521 (Utah 1979) 
38-1-11. Enforcement — Time for — Lis pendens — Action 
for debt not affected. 
Actions to enforce the liens herein provided for must be begun within 
twelve months after the completion of the original contract, or the suspension 
of work thereunder for a period of thirty days. Within the twelve months 
herein mentioned the lien claimant shall file for record with the county re-
corder of each county in which the lien is recorded a notice of the pendency of 
the action, in the manner provided in actions affecting the title or right to 
possession of real property, or the lien shall be void, except as to persons who 
have been made parties to the action and persons having actual knowledge of 
the commencement of the action, and the burden of proof shall be upon the 
lien claimant and those claiming under him to show such actual knowledge. 
Nothing herein contained shall be construed to impair or affect the right of 
any person to whom a debt may be due for any work done or materials fur-
nished to maintain a personal action to recover the same. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, §§ 1390, Cross-References. — Justices' courts juris-
1395; C.L. 1917, §§ 3740, 3745; L. 1931, ch. 5, diction to foreclose hen, § 78-5-2 
§ 1; R.S. 1933 & C 1943, 52-1-11. Lis pendens generally, § 78-40-2 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Another action pending 
Burden of proof 
Effect of untimely action 
Execution 
Extension of time for filing notice 
Findings and conclusions of law 
Lis pendens 
Nature of proceeding 
Parties 
Pleadings and proceedings 
Waiver and estoppel 
What law governs 
Cited 
Another action pending. 
Action in equity to foreclose mechanic's hen 
is not barred by pnoi suit at law to recover for 
materials sold and delivered State ex rel 
Dorsett v Morse, 36 Utah 362, 103 P 969 
I (1909). 
Burden of proof. 
Burden of proof is on claimant to show that 
he is entitled to the hen and has complied with 
the statute Hathaway v United Tmtic Mines 
Co, 42 Utah 520, 132 P 388 (1913), 
Greenhalgh v United Tmtic Mines Co, 42 
Utah 524, 132 P 390 (1913) 
Effect of untimely action. 
An untimely action under this section is ju-
risdictional and forecloses the rights of the par-
ties It is not subject to waiver and estoppel as 
are procedural statutes of limitations AAA 
533 
38-1-25 LIENS 
waives, releases, and discharges any hen or v Knudsen Bldrs Supply Co , 14 Utah 2d 419, 
right to lien that materialman might have or 385 P 2d 982 (1963) 
thereafter acquire against real property, such Where claims of materialman for mechanics' 
provision does not apply to any future hen hens are valid, he is entitled to a reasonable 
right which materialman might acquire Such attorney's fee under § 38-1-18 where penalty 
release relates only to the particular debt paid provided by this section for alleged failure of 
and receipted for in the particular transaction materialman to release hens is sought by 
Claims of materialman for mechanics' hens for builder who contends that the hens are invalid 
remainder due are valid entitling it to assert Bnmwood Homes, Inc v Knudsen Bldrs Sup-
and foreclose such hens Bnmwood Homes, Inc ply Co , 14 Utah 2d 419, 385 P 2d 982 (1963) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 57 C J S Mechanics' Liens § 246 
Key Numbers. — Mechanics' Liens «= 242 
38-1-25. Abuse of lien right — Penalty. 
Any person who knowingly causes to be filed for record a claim of lien 
against any property, which contains a greater demand than the sum due 
him, with the intent to cloud the title, or to exact from the owner or person 
liable by means of such excessive claim of lien more than is due him, or to 
procure any advantage or benefit whatever, is guilty of a misdemeanor. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1399; 
C.L. 1917, § 3749; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
52-1-25. 
38-1-26. Assignment of lien. 
All hens under this chapter shall be assignable as other choses in action, 
and the assignee may commence and prosecute actions thereon in his own 
name in the manner herein provided. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1396; 
C.L. 1917, § 3746; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
52-1-26. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Right to perfect lien. assignable Smoot v Checketts, 41 Utah 211, 
Under this section, right to perfect a lien is 125 P 412, 1915C Ann Cas 1113 Q912) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 53 Am Jur 2d Mechanics' C.J.S. — 57 C J S Mechanics' Liens *? 216 et 
Liens § 284 seq 
Key Numbers. — Mechanics' Liens «=» 202 
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mg to another person or persons an interest in land in which an interest is 
retained by the grantor and by declaring the creation of a joint tenancy by use 
of such words as herein provided In all cases the interest of joint tenants must 
be equal and undivided 
History: R.S 1898 & CL 1907, § 1973, C L. Cross-References. — Inheritance tax on 
1917, § 4873, R S 1933 & C. 1943, 78-1-5; L. jointly held property § 59-12-5 
1953, ch. 93, § 1. Interparty agreements, § 15-3-1 et seq 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Joint tenancies 
—Alienation and execution 
—Judicial sales 
—Severance by conveyance or sale 
Preference for tenancy in common 
Joint tenancies. of the property at a judicial sale was deemed to 
-Alienation and execution. *? for <*» benefit of all cotenants Jolley v 
The Supreme Court of the United States has C o r r y ' 6 7 1 P 2 d 1 3 9 ( U t a h 1 9 8 3 ) 
said that it would assume that "Utah accepts _ s e v e r a n c e b y conveyance or sale. 
the general common-law rules relating to joint
 T h e m l e t h a t a t t e „ s e v e r e d b 
tenancies, including the rules permitting
 o n e tenant,s h e s n o t o n l to v o l . 
alienation of the interest of a joint tenant and . , . , . , . 
, , , . i . , untary conveyances, but also to involuntary 
making its property subject to execution and J J '
 x , , , T n 
senarate sale " Manzus v Miller 317 U S 178 conveyances pursuant to judicial sales Jolley 
?3PS Ct 182 8?L Ed 1 8 ^ 5 ^ v Co^> 671 P 2d 139 ( U t a h 1 9 8 3 > 
317 US 712, 63 S Ct 432 87 L Ed 567 Preference for tenancy in common. 
(1943) This section expresses the trend away from 
—Judicial sales the English joint tenancy and in favor of ten-
Where a joint tenant defaulted on her obhga ancy in common Neill v Royce, 101 Utah 181, 
tion to a mortgagee her subsequent purchase 120 P 2d 327 (1941) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am Jur. 2d — 20 Am Jur 2d Cotenancy tenancy by conveyance of divided interest di-
and Joint Ownership § 27 rectlv to self 7 A L R 4th 1268 
C.J.S. — 86 C J S Tenanc\ in Common § 7 Key Numbers. — Tenancy in Common «=» 3 
A.L.R. — Severance or termination of joint 
57-1-6. Recording necessary to impart notice — Operation 
and effect — Interest of person not named in in-
strument. 
Every conveyance of real estate, and every instrument of writing setting 
forth an agreement to convey any real estate or whereby any real estate may 
be affected, to operate as notice to third persons shall be proved or acknowl-
edged and certified in the manner prescribed by this title and recorded in the 
office of the recorder of the county in which such real estate is situated, but 
shall be valid and binding between the parties thereto without such proofs, 
acknowledgment, certification or record, and as to all other persons who have 
had actual notice Neither the fact that an instrument, recorded as herein 
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provided, recites only a nominal consideration, nor the fact that the grantee in 
such instrument is designated as trustee, or that the conveyance otherwise 
purports to be in trust without naming the beneficiaries or stating the terms 
of the trust, shall operate to charge any third person with notice of the inter-
est of any person or persons not named in such instrument or of the grantor or 
grantors; but the grantee may convey the fee or such lesser interest as was 
conveyed to him by such instrument free and clear of all claims not disclosed 
by the instrument or by an instrument recorded as herein provided setting 
forth the names of the beneficiaries, specifying the interest claimed and de-
scribing the property charged with such interest. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1975; 
C.L. 1917, § 4875; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
78-1-6; L. 1945, ch. 106, § 1; 1947, ch. 97, § 1. 
Cross-References. — Acknowledgments 
generally, § 57-2-1 et seq. 
Certified copies of record of conveyance, ad-
mission in evidence, § 78-25-13. 
County recorder, § 17-21-1 et seq. 
Fees of recorder, § 21-2-3. 
Judgments, record of as imparting notice, 
§ 17-21-11. 
Recording generally, § 57-3-1 et seq. 
Transmitting documents by telegraph or 
telephone, § 69-1-2. 





—Duty to inquire. 
—Execution sales. 
—Occupancy and possession. 
—Trusts. 
Delivery of deed. 
Effect of failure to record. 
Equitable rights. 




Recital of consideration. 





A deed as between the parties and those hav-
ing notice thereof is good without any acknowl-
edgment, and actual possession constitutes no-
tice. Jordan v. Utah R.R., 47 Utah 519, 156 P. 
939 (1916) 
A deed need not be acknowledged to be valid 
between the parties thereto. Mitchell v. 
Palmer, 121 Utah 245, 240 P.2d 970 (1952). 
Acknowledgment taken by mortgagee him-
self as notary public is void; thus, a mortgage, 
acknowledged by the mortgagee, though re-
corded, is ineffective for purpose of notice, since 
it is not legally recordable. Norton v. Fuller, 68 
Utah 524, 251 P. 29 (1926). See § 57-2-1 et seq. 
Actual notice. 
—Assignments. 
Attaching creditors who had actual notice of 
assignment for benefit of creditors were not in 
position to object that statutory notice of as-
signment was not given. Snyder v. Murdock, 
20 Utah 407, 59 P. 88 (1899 >. 
—Duty to inquire. 
The demands of this section are answered if 
a party dealing with the land has information 
of a fact or facts that would put a prudent man 
upon inquiry and would, if pursued, lead to ac-
tual knowledge of the state of the title; this is 
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actual notice. Toland v. Corey, 6 Utah 392, 24 
P. 190 (1890), affd, 154 U.S. 499, 14 S. Ct. 
1144, 38 L. Ed. 1062 (1894), distinguished, 
Shafer v. Killpack, 53 Utah 468, 173 P. 948 
(1918). 
The "actual notice" required by this section 
is satisfied if a party dealing with the land had 
information of facts which would put a prudent 
man upon inquiry and which, if pursued, would 
lead to actual knowledge as to the state of the 
title; actual notice is a question of fact. John-
son v. Bell, 666 P.2d 308 (Utah 1983). 
—Execution sales. 
Where vendee purchased realty from one 
who had bought it at an execution sale and the 
record shows the consideration given at the 
sale was grossly inadequate, the levy excessive 
and no return made by the sheriff of any at-
tempt to levy on personal property, the vendee 
would not be justified in failing to make a rea-
sonable inquiry into the validity of the sale 
and if he did not make such inquiry, he would 
not be a bona fide purchaser for value. Pender 
v. Dowse, 1 Utah 2d 283, 265 P.2d 644, 42 
A.L.R.2d 1078 (1954). 
—Occupancy and possession. 
Even though auditor's tax deed and county 
tax deed were not acknowledged, title techni-
cally need not pass to protect a tax title claim-
ant, and also the deed is binding as to defen-
dant who had actual notice because of the 
claimant's occupancy of the property. Peterson 
v. Callister, 6 Utah 2d 359, 313 P.2d 814 
(1957), affd, 8 Utah 2d 348, 334 P.2d 759 
(1959). 
Actual occupancy is enough to put parties 
dealing with the premises upon inquiry. 
Toland v. Corey, 6 Utah 392, 24 P. 190 (1890), 
affd, 154 U.S. 499, 14 S. Ct. 1144, 38 L. Ed. 
1062 (1894). distinguished, Shafer v. Killpack 
53 Utah 468, 173 P. 948 (1918). 
Under this section actual possession and oc-
cupancy amounts to "actual notice" to all the 
world of grantee's rights even if his deed is not 
recorded. Neponset Land & Live Stock Co. v. 
Dixon, 10 Utah 334, 37 P. 573 (1894). 
—Trusts. 
Trustee under a deed of trust did not have 
actual notice of plaintiffs predecessors' inter-
est in the grazing land subject to the deed of 
trust where, at the time the deed of trust was 
executed and recorded, there were no cattle 
grazing on the land, no one living on the land, 
and no other evidence of any activity on the 
property which would have reasonably alerted 
the trustee to the claims of plaintiffs' predeces-
sors and which would have required further 
investigation. Johnson v. Bell, 666 P.2d 308 
(Utah 1983). 
Delivery of deed. 
Deed duly executed and acknowledged and 
shown to be in possession of grantee is sel 
proving both as to execution and delivery, an 
recording of deed is likewise evidence of deli' 
ery. Chamberlain v. Larsen, 83 Utah 420, i 
P.2d 355 (1934). 
Inference of delivery arising from possessic 
of deed by grantee and from recording there 
is entitled to great and controlling weight ai 
can only be overcome by clear and convincii 
evidence. Chamberlain v. Larsen, 83 Utah 42 
29 P.2d 355 (1934). 
Where duly acknowledged and recorded de 
was found among papers of deceased grant< 
inference of delivery and execution at abc 
date stated in deed arose, and burden was up 
those claiming nondelivery to show such fa 
Knighton v. Manning, 84 Utah 1, 33 P.2d 4 
(1934). 
In action by administrator of grantor agai 
executor of grantee, finding of nondelivery 
deed, found among effects of grantee, duly 
knowledged, and recorded three days ai 
death of grantor, was sustained by evider 
Knighton v. Manning, 84 Utah 1, 33 P.2d -
(1934). 
Assuming valid delivery of warranty dee< 
grandson of grantor, such deed would not j 
vail over right to property existing in t\ 
person who had previously acquired deed fi 
grantor, but who had not recorded same u 
after deed to grandson, where it appeared 1 
land was in possession of occupant as ] 
chaser from, and, after default, as tenan 
third person. Meagher v. Dean, 97 Utah 
91 P.2d 454 (1939). 
Effect of failure to record. 
Where, after mortgage was executed on 
tain tract of land, owner executed dee< 
grantee on property not included in mortg 
which deed was not recorded, decree in ac 
to foreclose mortgage on tract of land, in< 
ing part conveyed to grantee, was not bin 
on grantee who was not party to such ac 
Federal Land Bank v. Pace, 87 Utah 15< 
P.2d 480, 102 A.L.R. 819 (1935). 
Recordation is not a prerequisite to th< 
lidity of a deed; although unrecorded, deec 
binding on the parties thereto. Gregers< 
Jensen, 669 P.2d 396 (Utah 1983). 
Equitable rights. 
This section itself gives no equities; e 
applies this section in determining eqi 
Federal Land Bank v. Pace, 87 Utah 156 
48 P.2d 480, 102 A.L.R. 819 (1935). 
Livery of seizin. 
In Utah, livery of seizin is unknown. N< 
ute has expressly abolished it, but by us 
is dispensed with. Wells, Fargo & Co. v. £ 




This section applies to mortgages. Priorities 
between successive mortgages, however, are 
-Lerned by general principles of mortgage 
uw State v. Johnson, 71 Utah 572, 268 P. 561 
(19281 
patents. 
Record showing that patent was duly exe-
cuted and verified as provided by law is admis-
lible. Tate v. Rose, 35 Utah 229, 99 P. 1003 
[1909). 
priorities. 
Where contract vendor, notwithstanding 
that there was still balance due on purchase 
jrice, executed warranty deed in trust, for pro-
tection of purchaser and to secure loan, and 
fnade assignment of his interest with knowl-
edge and consent of trustee and vendee, and 
subsequently creditor of vendor recovered judg-
ment against him, and after sheriffs sale sold 
lis interest to bank which recorded deed prior 
JO assignment, bank was entitled to priority as 
igainst assignee. Huffaker v. First Nat'l Bank, 
\2 Utah 317, 173 P. 903 (1918). 
lecital of consideration. 
This section does not provide that a nominal 
onsideration is not such a circumstance as to 
>lace a third person on notice of any outstand-
ng interests but rather that the recital of a 
tominal consideration in a deed or other re-
corded instrument shall not have that effect. It 
is a well-known fact that often a conveyance 
recites a nominal consideration whereas the 
true consideration is not nominal. It is there-
fore never certain that the recited consider-
ation is the true consideration. This is not the 
case in an execution sale. In such a sale there 
can be no doubt in the mind of the purchaser as 
to what was the actual consideration. Pender v. 
Dowse, 1 Utah 2d 283, 265 P.2d 644, 42 
A.L.R.2d 1078 (1954). 
Recordation as notice. 
—In general. 
One who deals with real property is charged 
with notice of what is shown by the records of 
the county recorder of the county in which the 
property is situated. Crompton v. Jenson, 78 
Utah 55, 1 P.2d 242 (1931). 
—Forged deed. 
The recording of a forged deed gives no no-
tice as to its contents and a bona fide purchaser 
from the person who forged the deed takes 
nothing. Rasmussen v. OJsen, 583 P.2d 50 
(Utah 1978). 
"Recorded" construed. 
There is nothing in this section which specif-
ically defines what is meant by the word "re-
corded." Boyer v. Pahvant Mercantile & Inv. 
Co., 76 Utah 1, 287 P. 188 (1930). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 66 Am. Jur. 2d Records and 
Recording Laws § 47 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 26 C.J.S. Deeds § 74; 92 C.J.S. 
Vendor and Purchaser § 325. 
A.L.R. — Failure of vendor to comply with 
tatute or ordinance requiring approval or re-
ording of plat prior to conveyance of property 
s rendering sale void or voidable, 77 A.L.R.3d 
058. 
Recorded real property instrument as charg-
ing third party with constructive notice of pro-
visions of extrinsic instrument referred to 
therein, 89 A.L.R.3d 901. 
Key Numbers. — Deeds «=» 82; Vendor and 
Purchaser <*= 227. 
>7-l-7. Applicability of chapter. 
This act shall apply to all instruments, whether recorded prior to or subse-
[uent to the effective date hereof, but as to instruments which have been 
ecorded prior thereto, it shall not apply until one year from its effective date. 
History: L. 1945, ch. 106, § 2; 1947, ch. 97, 
2; C. 1943, Supp., 78-1-6.10. 
Meaning of "this act". — The phrase "This 
ct" appearing at the beginning of this section 
ppeared in this section both as enacted by L. 
945, ch. 106, § 2 and as amended (without 
lange) by L. 1947, ch. 97, § 2 and appears to 
& referring to those acts. The former act (L. 
^45, ch. 106) amended § 57-1-6 and enacted 
this section, while the latter act (L. 1947, ch. 
92) amended both § 57-1-6 and this section. 
Meaning of "effective date hereof." — 
The phrase "effective date hereof appearing in 
this section appeared in this section both as 
enacted by L. 1945, ch. 106, § 2 and as 
amended by L. 1947, ch. 97, § 2. The effective 
dates of L. 1945, ch. 106 and L. 1947, ch. 97 are 
May 8, 1945 and May 13, 1947, respectively. 
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party. If the adverse party timely objects to the cost bill, the clerk, upon 
reasonable notice and hearing, shall determine and settle the costs and tax 
the same, and a judgment shall be entered thereon against the adverse party. 
The determination by the clerk shall be reviewable by the Court of Appeals 
upon the request of either party made within five days of the entry of judg-
ment; unless otherwise ordered, oral argument shall not be permitted. A judg-
ment under this section may be filed with the clerk of any district court in the 
state, who shall docket a certified copy of the same in the manner and with 
the same force and effect as judgments of the district court. 
Rule 35. Petition for rehearing. 
(a) Time for filing; contents; answer; oral argument not permitted. A 
rehearing will not be granted in the absence of a petition for rehearing. A 
matter may not be reheard by the court en banc. A petition for rehearing may 
be filed with the clerk within 14 days after the entry of the decision of the 
Court of Appeals, unless the time is shortened or enlarged by order. The 
petition shall state with particularity the points of law or fact which the 
petitioner claims the court has overlooked or misapprehended and shall con-
tain such argument in support of the petition as the petitioner so desires. 
Counsel for the petitioner must certify that the petition is presented in good 
faith and not for delay. Oral argument in support of the petition will not be 
permitted. No answer to a petition for rehearing will be received unless re-
quested by the court. 
(b) Form of petition; length. The petition shall be in a form prescribed by 
Rule 27(a), and copies shall be served and filed as prescribed by Rule 26(b). 
Except by permission and order of the court, a petition for rehearing and any 
response requested by the court shall not exceed 15 pages. 
(c) Action by court if granted. If a petition for rehearing is granted, the 
court may make a final disposition of the cause without reargument, may 
restore it to the calendar for reargument or resubmission, or may make such 
other orders as are deemed appropriate under the circumstances of the partic-
ular case. 
(d) Untimely or consecutive petitions. Petitions for rehearing that are 
not timely presented under this rule and consecutive petitions for rehearing 
will not be received by the clerk. 
Rule 36. Issuance of remittitur. 
(a) Date of issuance. The remittitur of the court shall issue 15 days after 
the entry of the judgment, unless the time is shortened or enlarged by order. A 
certified copy of the opinion of the court, any direction as to costs, and the 
record of the proceedings shall constitute the remittitur. 
(b) Stay of remittitur pending rehearing petition. The timely filing of a 
petition for rehearing will stay the remittitur until disposition of the petition, 
unless otherwise ordered by the court. If the petition is denied, the remittitur 
shall issue immediately after entry of the order denying the petition, unless 
the court otherwise orders. 
(c) Stay, supersedeas, or injunction pending application for review to 
Supreme Court of Utah and Supreme Court of United States. A stay or 
supersedeas of the remittitur or an injunction pending application for review 
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Mast Construction Company, a Utah 
corporation, Ron Mast as assignee 
of the rights of Intermountain Glass 
and Paint Company, a Utah corporation. 
United Pacific Reliance Insurance 
Company, a Washington corporation, 
and Oakhills Condominium Limited 
Partnership, a Utah limited partnership, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Ron Mast as assignee of the rights of 
Intermountain Glass and Paint Company, 
a Utah corporation, 
Crossclaim Plaintiff and Appellant, 
Mast Construction Company, a Utah 
corporation. United Pacific Reliance 
Insurance Company, a Washington 
corporation, and Oakhills Condominium 
Limited Partnership, a Utah limited 
partnership, 
Crossclaim Defendants I 
and Appellant. 
Ron Mast as assignee of the rights of 
Intermountain Glass and Paint Company, 
a Utah corporation. 
Third-party Plaintiff and Appellant, 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 860355-CA 
F I L E D 
Tirr ilhy ,A Snoa 
<{< o' the Court 
Utah Court of Appeels 
V . 
State Savings & Loan Association; 
Utah State Tax Commission; Robert P. 
Hansen; Capitol Glass & Aluminum; 
Ron Mast as assignee of the rights of 
Debenham Electrical Supply Co,: 
Electro Tech Corporation: Ron Mast as 
assignee of the rights of Marathon Steel 
Company; Edwards & Daniels Associates; 
and John Brown & Associates; and John 
and Jane Does 1 thru 100, 
Third-party Defendants and 
Appellants. 
Ron Mast as assignee of the rights of 
Marathon Steel Company, 
an Arizona corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Mast Construction Company, a Utah 
corporation; Oakhills Condominium 
Limited Partnership, a Utah limited 
partnership; and United Pacific 
Reliance Insurance Company, 
a Washington corporation, 
Defendants and Appellant. 
Mast Construction Company, a 
Utah corporation, 
Third-party Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Pacific Western Industries, Inc., 
a Utah corporation, Oakhills 
Condominium Limited Partnership, 
a Utah limited partnership, and 
Edwards & Daniels Associates, Inc., 
Third-party Defendants. 
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American Savings & Loan Association, 
a California corporation, formerly 
State Savings and Loan Association, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Oakhills Partnership, a Utah limited 
partnership; Pacific Western of Utah, 
Inc., a Utah corporation, formerly 
Pacific Western Industries, Inc., a Utah 
corporation; Charles W. Akerlow; Richard 
J. Anderson; State Tax Commission of 
Utah, Robert P. Hansen; Capital Glass 
and Aluminum Corporation, a Utah 
corporation; Ron Mast as assignee of the 
rights of Debenham Electric Supply 
Company, Inc., an Alaska corporation; 
Electro Technical Corp., a Utah 
corporation: Ron Mast as assignee of 
the rights of Intermountain Glass & 
Paint Co., a Utah corporation; General 
Glass Corp., a Colorado corporation; 
Ron Mast as assignee of the rights of 
Marathon Steel Co., an Arizona 
corporation; Edwards & Daniels 
Associates, Inc., a Utah corporation; 
Ogden's Carpet Outlet, a Utah 
corporation; Mast Construction Co., a 
Utah corporation; Mildred S. Freymuller; 
and John Does 1 thru 30, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Ron Mast as assignee of the rights of 
Debenham Electric Supply Company, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Electro Technical Corporation, 
Mast Construction Company, the 
Oakhills Partnership, and 
United Pacific Insurance Company, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
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Before Judges Davidson, Bench and Jackson. 
DAVIDSON, Judge: 
American Savings and Loan Association (American) loaned 
funds to the Oakhills Partnership (Oakhills) for the 
construction of Oakhills Condominiums. Oakhills, a Utah 
limited partnership, had Pacific Western Industries, Inc. 
(Pacific Western), a Utah corporation, as the general partner. 
Charles W. Akerlow (Akerlow) and Richard J, Anderson (Anderson) 
were, respectively, chairman of the board and president of 
Pacific Western. 
The March 28, 1983, loan from American to Oakhills was 
secured by a promissory note and a deed of trust. Akerlow and 
Anderson signed the deed of trust but the loan amount, date of 
the note, identity of the trustee, and the seal of Pacific 
Western were omitted. The deed of trust was recorded with the 
Salt Lake County Recorder on April 8, 1983. It was rerecorded 
on April 20, 1983. The date and the amount of the note were 
added at that time. An "X" was placed over the initial 
recording with a line-out placed on the book and page numbers 
of that recording. On April 26, 1983, Western States Title 
Company (Western States) was added to the deed of trust as 
trustee and the April 20th recording was crossed out in the 
same manner. At trial, Akerlow testified the deed of trust, 
Mas completely filled in," conformed to "the terms of [the] 
deal" with American. 
Jeffrey J. Jensen (Jensen), vice president of Western 
States, acknowledged the deed of trust in his capacity as a 
notary public. He testified that he could not "remember 
specifically" whether Akerlow and Anderson were present when he 
acknowledged their signatures. Neither could Jensen state 
whether the two officers of Pacific Western were placed under 
oath "as to their corporate authority." Jensen did testify 
that it was his "customary practice" to have the parties sign 
documents "at the time of closing" and he would acknowledge 
them. It was not his practice to place them under oath. 
Additionally, Jensen testified to his personal knowledge of 
Akerlow and Anderson. 
A representative of American testified that Jensen, 
Akerlow, and Anderson were present at the closing. He also 
testified Ronald E. Mast, president of Mast Construction 
Company, the general contractor, was present for a portion of 
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the closing. The representative could not remember exactly how 
the closing was conducted. Ron Mast denied he was present at 
the closing, that he had ever seen American's representative 
prior to the trial, and that he had ever been Hto the business" 
of Western States. 
Ron Mast claimed work began on Oakhills Condominiums 
prior to April 8, 1983, the date of the initial recording of 
the deed of trust by American. However, the notice of lien 
recorded by Mast Construction Company indicated April 28, 1983, 
as the date the Hfirst labor, material and equipment was 
performed.H In an answer to an interrogatory, Ron Mast listed 
April 18, 1983, as the date on which "work was commenced, or 
materials were furnished on the ground for the structure, or 
improvement constructed on the property.* Roger J. Mast, vice 
president of Mast Construction Company, was questioned at trial 
about his deposition. There, he answered that he "started the 
job- on April 18, 1983. 
W. David Hammons (Hammons), president of Electro 
Technical Corporation (Electro Tech) and a subcontractor on 
Oakhills Condominiums, filed a notice of lien which indicated 
May 6, 1983, as the da£e Electro Tech commenced work. However, 
Hammons testified at trial a temporary power panel and pole, a 
coil of wire, and some conduit were placed at the building site 
on April 6, 1983. Mast Construction Company relies on Electro 
Tech's placement of electrical equipment at the site to 
establish the priority of its lien over American's deed of 
trust. 
Another lienholder filed a complaint on March 14, 1985, 
to foreclose its lien on Oakhills Condominiums. Other similar 
actions were consolidated with the result that Mast 
Construction Company and Ron Mast are appellants and American 
the respondent.1 On June 19, 1986, the trial court granted 
American partial summary judgment which stated the deed of 
trust at issue, as recorded on April 8, 1983, was operative as 
either a deed of trust or mortgage. The court reserved the 
propriety of the signatures' acknowledgment and the date work 
commenced on Oakhills Condominiums for the bench trial which 
was held on July 25 and 26, 1986. An order for entry of final 
judgment was filed on November 18, 1986, which declared 
American's deed of trust was a valid lien against Oakhills 
Condominiums and had priority over all other liens against that 
project. The trial court directed the entry of judgment as 
final pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). 
1. Other lien claimants have assigned their claims to Ron Mast 
resulting in his being an appellant personally as well as 
president of Mast Construction Company, the other appellant. 
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Appellants present two issues for review; (1) was the 
recording of the deed of trust as it appeared on April 8# 1983/ 
effective in view of the omissions thereon and that the 
signators were not placed under oath; and (2) did the placement 
of the electrical equipment at the building site of Oakhills 
Condominiums on April 6, 1983, constitute commencement to do 
work for purposes of Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-5 (1974)? 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) requires that findings of fact 
"shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due 
regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to 
judge the credibility of the witnesses." However, we accord 
the trial court's conclusions of law no particular deference, 
but review them for correctness. Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 
1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
THE DEED OF TRUST 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-6 (1986) states: 
Every conveyance of real estate, and 
every instrument of writing setting forth 
an agreement to convey any real estate or 
whereby any real estate may be affected, 
to operate as notice to third persons 
shall be proved or acknowledged and 
certified in the manner prescribed by this 
title and recorded in the office of the 
recorder of the county in which such real 
estate is situated, but shall be valid and 
binding between the parties thereto 
without such proofs, acknowledgment, 
certification or record, and as to all 
other persons who have had actual notice 
(emphasis added). 
The "actual notice" exception to the requirement that a 
conveyance or instrument be validly recorded to impart notice 
to third persons is discussed in Johnson v. Bell, 666 P.2d 308 
(Utah 1983). There the Utah Supreme Court stated actual notice 
was a question of fact. The Court wrote: 
This statute was under examination by this 
Court in Toland v. Corey, 6 Utah 392, 24 
P. 190 (1890), where we held that the 
"actual notice" required by § 57-1-6 was 
satisfied if a party dealing with the land 
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had information of facts which would put a 
prudent man upon inquiry and which/ if 
pursued/ would lead to actual knowledge as 
to the state of the title. See a similar 
expression in McGarry v. Thompson, 114 
Utah 442/ 201 P.2d 288 (1948). 
Id. at 310. Accord Stumph v. Church, 740 P.2d 820 (Utah App. 
1987). 
In the instant case it is not necessary to address the "duty 
to inquireH prong of actual notice. The record on appeal 
contains numerous exhibits. American's exhibit 32/ received by 
the trial court, is a letter written on March 24, 1983. In it, 
American's representative at the closing sent Jensen a list of 
conditions to be fulfilled prior to closing. Condition number 6 
requires, MYou must have in your possession the Subordination 
Agreement signed by Mast Construction Co. Inc." American's 
exhibit 33, also received, is that agreement in which Mast 
Construction Company subordinated to American a specific sum 
until the occurrence of certain events set forth in the document. 
The agreement was dated March 28, 1983, the day of closing, and 
was signed by American's representative and by Ron Mast in his 
capacity as president of Mast Construction Company. The legal 
description of the property on the exhibit attached to the 
subordination agreement is the same as that depicted on the 
exhibit to the deed of trust. At trial, American's 
representative testified the subordination agreement had been 
executed by the time of closing because of a notation on exhibit 
32 followed by his initials. 
In view of the above, we find that Ron Mast had actual notice 
of the deed of trust at issue prior to April 6, 1983, the date on 
which he relies to establish the priority of his lien. As a 
consequence of his actual notice, the deed of trust is valid and 
binding as to Ron Mast and Mast Construction Company. 
Because of the above, it is unnecessary to analyze whether 
Hammons' placement of electrical equipment at the building site 
constituted commencement to do work for the purpose of satisfying 
the mechanics' lien statutes, Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-1-1 to -26 
(1974). The validity of the April 6, 1983 lien date is 
immaterial once the priority of American's deed of trust is 
established as to appellants. 
The judgment of the court below that American's deed of trust 
was valid and had priority over all other liens is affirmed. 
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Costs against appellants. 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
I CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
JACKSON, Judge: (Concurring in result only) 
Without addressing* whether the April 8 trust deed from 
Oakhills' general partner to American was legally effective to 
create a lien, the majority has determined that it was "valid 
and binding" on Ron Mast and his company. The majority examines 
the record evidence and makes a factual finding that was not 
made by the trial court, namely, that Mast had actual notice of 
the April 8 trust deed. This actual notice arises solely from 
the fact that, on March 28, Mast signed a subordination 
agreement that clearly informed him that American was loaning 
money to Oakhills for the condominium construction project on 
which Mast Construction Company and other lien claimants 
eventually worked. That agreement, however, does not mention 
anything about an existing or planned trust deed on the project 
site from Oakhills to American as security for the construction 
loan. I fail to see how it proves that Mast had actual notice 
of a deed of trust that was not even executed until after the 
subordination agreement was signed. 
I am concerned that, under the majority's reasoning, no 
person who supplies material or labor on a construction job 
bigger than a child's sandbox will ever be able to achieve lien 
priority over an entity that loans money on the project. Every 
materialman on any job big enough to look like it requires 
financing will be charged with knowing or having reason to know 
that, at some unknown future time, the lender will require the 
borrower to execute a deed of trust to secure a loan. This 
result undermines the purpose of the mechanics' lien statute, 
which is "to protect those who have added directly to the value 
of property by performing labor or furnishing materials upon 
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it.- stanton TransPt Cpf Y» PavJlS/ 9 Utah 2d 184, 187, 341 
P.2d 207, 209 (1959) (quoted with approval in First of Denver 
Mortcr. Inv. v. C. N. Zundel & Assocs., 600 P.2d 521, 524-25 
(1979)). The majority's decision requires the materialman to 
become a fortune teller, thereby opening Pandora's box in cases 
where predictability is needed. 
Furthermore, I do not believe that a third party's "actual 
notice" can turn an invalid legal instrument into one that 
creates a valid lien superior to the mechanic's lien of the 
third party. In other words, if an instrument of conveyance is 
defective in some material way, such that it is ineffective to 
create an encumbrance on the subject property notwithstanding 
its recording, how can it be legally effective as a superior 
lien as against a supplier of materials or labor, even one who 
knows (or could guess) that it is in existence? Significantly, 
the statute relied upon by the majority, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 57-1-6 (1986), makes an instrument valid and binding against 
a third party with actual notice even though it is "without 
such acknowledgment, certification or record[ing]" as the 
statutes require. The statute does not make an instrument with 
other material defects^ such as those alleged in this case, 
valid and binding against either a party to the legally 
defective instrument or a third party with actual notice of it. 
Like the trial court, I believe the relevant issues are: 
(1) was the trust deed, as recorded on April 8, legally 
effective to create a lien, with the result that its recording 
on April 8 gave constructive notice to the world of American's 
lien from that date? and (2) if so, did work commence on the 
site, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-5 (1988), prior to 
April 8? 
I agree with the trial court that the alleged defects and 
omissions in the April 8 trust deed did not deprive it of legal 
validity or recordability and that one lien claimant's 
placement of a temporary power panel and coil of wire at the 
project construction site on April 6, on the ground next to a 
pile of trash, would not impart sufficient notice that the 
materialman's work had commenced. See Western Morta. Loan 
Corp. v. Cottonwood Constr. Co., 18 Utah 2d 409, 424 P.2d 437, 
439 (1967); Tripp v. Vaughn, 747 P.2d 1051, 1055 (Utah App. 
1987). I therefore join in the affirmance of the judgment of 
the trial court. 
Norma*?! H. Jackson,^fudge 
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